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CRIMINAL OMISSIONS
GRAHAM HUGHES"
ALL regulation must be concerned with the things we ought not to do, the
things we may do and the things we ought to do. The law is composed of
hypothetical patterns of conduct-conduct from which we must abstain on
pain of sanction, conduct which we must pursue to attain certain ends and,
more rarely, conduct which we must follow to avoid penalty. In criminal law,
the classic picture has been of a body of prohibitions, but the criminal law has
never been exclusively prohibitive. And this is not surprising, for even the
Decalogue contains incitement to positive action and the western religious
concept of sin has always contemplated inactivity as sometimes immoral. But,
for the most part, our criminal law in its progress has only occasionally and
almost reluctantly admitted the offense of omission within its scope. In recent
decades the picture has been changing, and one of the most significant features
of the modern development of penal laws has been the widening range of lia-
bility for crimes of inactivity. But this contemporary development has received
little explicit treatment from modern Anglo-American writers on criminal
law.'
THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL OMISSIONS
Roman law knew little of criminal liability for omissions. There were only
a few delicts in omittendo, chief of which were the failure of a slave to defend
his master from assault, the failure of a soldier to assist his superior officer
when the superior was taken by the enemy, the failure of a husband to prevent
his wife from becoming a prostitute and the failure of a son to inform his father
of a trap which his brother was laying for the father.2 There is too in the
Digest the text of Paul, "nullum crimen patitur is qui non prohibet cuin pro-
hibere non potest," which seems to hint at some kind of liability for omissions
but which is unclear in its import.3 Certainly, these fragmentary instances of
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1. For helpful discussions, see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW C. 9
(1947) ; Perkins, Negative Acts in Criminal Law, 22 IowA L. REv. 659 (1937) ; Kirch-
heiner, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REv. 615 (1942); Snyder, Liability for Negative
Conduct, 35 VA. L. REv. 446 (1949). Continental European writers have devoted more
attention to the question of criminal omissions. See, in France, GAND, DU D9LIT DE
CommissioN PAR OMIssioN (1900); Appleton, L'Abstention Fautive, 1912 REv. TRaM.
593; COHIN, L'ABsTioN FAUTiVE (1929); ALBARET-MoNTPEYROUX, L'INAcrroN EN
DRoIT PANAL (1944).
2. GAND, op. cit. mipra note 1, at 40-41; ALBARET-MONTPEYROUX, op. cit. supra note
1, at 9.
3. DIGEST 50.17.109. MOMmSEN, R6:MiscHEs SmsiRCHT 91 (1899), takes the view
that the passage indicates the absence of liability in criminal law for omission. The sug-
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liability for inaction made no substantial impact on the application of Roman
law, and we know of no conceptual difficulties or adjustments to which they
gave rise.
The early English institutional writers again show little awareness of crim-
inal omissions as a field of liability of any special significance. Coke, in his
Third Institute, seems to regard positive action as an almost inevitable element
of guilt. He always insists on the overt deed: even the liability for treason in
compassing the death of the monarch has to be excused and explained away
as a special case. 4 The only offenses of omission clearly- recognized are mis-
prision of treason, 5 misprision of felony 6 and failure to yield up treasure
trove.7
That Coke was not comprehensive in his treatment of criminal omissions
appears from an examination of the editions of Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown,
the first of which appeared in 1716. Here we find a slightly expanded cata-
logue of offenses of failure to act. In addition to those mentioned by Coke,
Hawkins discusses the pervasive offense of common nuisance: "It seems, that
a common nuisance may be defined to be an offence against the public, either
by doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, or by
neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires." But the numerous
examples of nuisance which he gives are all cases of commission. Again, he
lists the communal duty imposed by the common law on parishioners or the
inhabitants of a county to keep highways and bridges in good repair.9 Of
gestion has also been made that the passage refers only to the responsibility of the father
or master to control a child or slave, GAND, op. cit. supra note 1, introduction at 1, and,
again, that it may bear quite a different significance and refer to the element of consent in
assault cases, Honig, Zur Frage der Strafbarkeit der Unterlassung im r6inischen Recht,
in FEsTsCan-rr FOR HnaRnox 63 (1930). See also Kirchheimer, supra note 1, at 615.
4. COKE, THIRD INsTITUTE 5 (1817 ed.). Coke writes: "So as if a man had com-
passed the death of another, and had uttered the same by words or writing, yet he should
not have died for it, for there wanted an overt deed tending to the execution of his com-
passing .... But . . . in the case of the king, if a man had compassed or imagined the
death of the king (who is the head of the commonwealth) and had declared his com-
passing or imagination by words or writing, this had been high treason and sufficient
overture by the ancient law."
5. As Coke points out, this was treason itself at common law but was made a
separate offense by 1. & 2 PH. & MARY C. 10 (1554). COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 36 (1817
ed.). See also FOSTER, Discourse of High Treason, in CROWN CASES 181, 195 (1791 ed.).
In the United States an offense of misprision of treason was created by the Act of April
30, 1790, 1 STAT. 112 (see now 18 U.S.C. § 2382 (1952)). The French CODE PANAL
art. 103 (53d ed., Dalloz 1,956) punishes with imprisonment up to ten years anyone who,
having knowledge of projects or acts of treason or espionage, does not report them to
military, administrative or judicial authorities as soon as he knows of them. These
offenses are known in France as d~lits de non-dbzonciation. See DoNNEDIEU DE VARRES,
TRAIT9 DE DROIT Cimixs 253, 437 (1947).
6. CoxE, THnU INsTITUTE 139 (1817 ed.).
7. Id. at 132.
8. 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 692 (Curwood ed. 1824) (hereinafter cited
as HAwiaNs).
9. Id. at 696. Stating that any inhabitant may be proceeded against, Hawkins offers
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greater interest in the field of common-law liability for omissions is the sug-
gestion for the first time that homicide may be based on a failure to act, a
notion significantly absent in Coke. The suggestion is admittedly a faint one,
occurring in the following passage:
"Also he who wilfully neglects to prevent a mischief, which he may
and ought to provide against, is, as some have said, in judgment of the
law, the actual cause of the damage which ensues; and therefore if a man
have an ox or a horse, which he knows to be mischievous, by being used
to gore or strike at those who come near them, and do not tie them up,
but leave them to their liberty, and they afterwards kill a man, according
to some opinions, the owner may be indicted as having himself feloniously
killed him; and this is agreeable to the Mosaical law. However, as it is
agreed by all, such a person is certainly guilty of a very gross misdemean-
our."
1 0
Hawkins has no further discussions of liability for omissions at common
law.11 However, a frail but interesting group of statutory offenses of inaction
an interesting anticipation of the objection sometimes raised to an extension of the duty
to rescue-that liability might extend to a throng of bystanders. An American case in
which an indictment succeeded for common nuisance against highway supervisors for
neglect to repair was Edge v. Commonwealth, 7 Pa. 275 (1847). New Hampshire, in
the early nineteenth century, enjoyed a statute which provided that "if any town shall
neglect to erect or keep in repair a guide-post or guide-board at each intersection of the
highways therein, they shall forfeit for each month's neglect the sum of one dollar." The
provision had germs of profit, since the penalty was recoverable by anyone who might
sue. However, the New Hampshire supreme court held, in Clark v. Lisbon, 19 N.H. 286
(1848), that a separate penalty did not accrue for each unposted intersection and that one
dollar payed for a whole month's neglect.
10. 1 HAWKINS 92. His reference to the Mosaical law is presumably to Exodus,
21.:29: "But if the ox were to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified
to his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or woman, the
ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." This is an interesting juxta-
position of a primitive imposition of liability on animals with a highly civilized recog-
nition of the owner's duty of care, though breach of the latter is rather severely punished.
Liability for negligent control of animals is a popular instance of liability for omissions.
1 PHILLIPS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 125 (1889), refers to the nineteenth-
century Chinese Penal Code: "When horses, horned cattle, or dogs are viciously inclined,
either to kick or bite .. .if the owner does not set a mark on them, and tie them up in
the customary manner, or if he does not kill his dogs when they become mad, he shall be
punished with forty blows. If, in consequence of such neglect, any person is killed .. .
the owner of the animal shall be obliged to redeem himself from the punishment of man-
slaughter .. .by the payment of the legal fine." In 1927, the Cour de Cassation decided
that a verdict of guilty of manslaughter was rightly brought against a man who had neg-
lected to control his dog which had bitten the deceased on the leg and caused tetanus and
death. Cour de cassation (Ch. crim.), Nov. 18, 1927, [1928] Sirey Recueil G~n6ral I. 192.
11. STROUD, MENS REA 155 (1914), suggests that at common law there were only
seven offenses of omission: "(1) Contempts by failure to comply with mandatory orders
of the Court. (2) Public nuisances by nonfeasance. (3) Default in the maintenance of a
public ferry .... (4) Refusal to serve in a public office .... (5) Misprision of felony.
(6) Failure by a magistrate to suppress a riot. (7) Failure by any person to assist public
officers in such suppression, in the arrest of offenders or in the keeping of the peace."
[Vol. 67: 590
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can be found. The religious offense of not coming to church, for example,
was created by 1 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1558). Under this statute, reasonable excuse
was recognized as a defense but the burden of showing it, Hawkins says, was
on the defendant, 12 an interesting early demonstration of the necessity for dis-
locating traditional concepts of the criminal law when dealing with omissions.
Hawkins has another comment on the offense-one of the earliest analyses
of the nature of conduct involved in an omission. He says: "The offence in
not coming to church, consisting wholly in a nonfeasance, and not supposing
any act done, but barely the omission of what ought to be done, need not be
alleged in any certain place; for, properly speaking, it is not committed any-
where."'
3
Another early criminal omission was nonconformity in office, committed by
a holder of public office who had not taken the oath of supremacy and alle-
giance, and punishable by a fine of five hundred pounds.' 4 Closely allied are
the offenses of refusal-refusal to make a declaration against popery,' 5 refusal
to give personal assistance to the king and refusal to return home from a for-
eign country on a request by privy seal or proclamation when the foreign
country was in rupture with England. 16 Are the offenses of refusal ones of
omission or commission? This would seem to turn on whether silence and in-
activity in the face of a request for positive action would have been sufficient
for liability. The language of the statutes shows clearly that in some cases the
duty to act did not depend upon a request; in others, liability only arose on
refusal to accept a declaration when tenderedY1 Even in the latter cases
silence would presumably have been sufficient to incur liability; thus, they
all may be properly described as offenses of omission. Still, the distinction
does underline the different circumstances under which a duty to act may be
imposed-the varying conditions precedent to triggering the duty under dif-
ferent enactments.
Another instance of the positive duty to act found in Hawkins's commen-
tary is the burden imposed on masters of merchant ships not to abandon
12. 1 HAWKIN S 373. By 3 JAC. 1, c. 4 (1605), the offense was extended to those
who maintained in their houses anyone who did not go to church.
13. 1 HAWKINS 373.
14. Id. at 369. The offense was created by the Test Act, 1672, 25 CAR. 2, c. 2.
15. 1 HAWKINS 397. The relevant statutes are 30 CAR. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1678) ; 1. GEO.
1, c. 13 (1714) ; 1 WILL. & MARY chapters 9, 15, 26 (1688).
16. Refusing assistance to the king apparently did not amount to treason but was
regarded as a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment. Refusal to return
home upon privy seal or proclamation might amount to evidence of adhering to the king's
enemies and so to treason. See 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 80 (1806).
17. Under 30 CAR. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1678), and 1 Gm. 1, c. 13 (1714), an unconditional
duty was imposed to take oaths against the practices of the Church of Rome. These
statutes were directed at those sitting in Parliament or in the service of the king. But,
under 1 WILL. & MARY chapters 9, 15, 26 (1688), liability only arose on refusal to sub-
scribe to a declaration tendered by justices. These acts were concerned with residence
within ten miles of London, bearing arms and presenting to a church.
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any member of the crew.' 8 Traditionally, and for obvious reasons, the re-
lationship of master to crew has been regarded as a peculiarly paternalistic
one, imposing a broader sweep of duty than the common law was generally
ready to recognize. 19 Indeed, the common law seems to have granted a higher
place to the interests of seamen than to those of children. Hawkins never
suggests liability for homicide through neglect of children. He seems to de-
mand a positive act of dangerous exposure by the parent before imposition
of liability, as in the case he cites of "the harlot, who, being delivered of a
child, left it in an orchard covered only with leaves, in which condition it
was struck by a kite, and died thereof."
21
But most significant is an absence, even in the later editions of Hawkins,
of that cloud of offenses which was later to plague the consciences of the
commentators on criminal law, the public welfare offenses of strict liability.
In Curwood's edition of Hawkins in 1824, a brief section is devoted to the
old statutes on regulating the price of victuals, dating mostly from the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They include prohibitions against
the adulteration of beer, butter, cheese and honey and directions for the
preservation of fish and fruit. Most are prohibitive, but one example of lia-
bility for an omission occurs, a provision that: "[E]very potter shall set
upon every pot which he shall make for the packing of butter the just weight
of such pot when burnt, and his christian and surname .... on pain of one
shilling for every pot he shall omit so to mark; and every farmer or packer
of butter, two shillings for every pot he uses so omitted to be marked .... ,"1
In this edition of Hawkins, the section on "Offences Against the Public
Health" is confined to selling unwholesome provisions, spreading the plague
and neglect of the quarantine laws.2 2 East, in his Pleas of the Crown,2 3 also
knows nothing of the new aspect of criminal liability, which was in fact just
18. 11 Will. 3, c. 7 (1698-99), provided: "In case any master of a merchant ship
or vessel shall . . . force any man on shore, or Wilfully leave him behind . . . or shall
refuse to bring home With him again all such of the men which he carried out with him
• . . every such master shall . . . suffer three months imprisonment .... ." See 1 HAW-
KINS 120.
19. See the comment of the Court of Appeals of New York in Ives v. South Buffalo
Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 311, 94 N.E. 431, 446 (1911): "The maritime law has wisely and
benevolently built up peculiar rights and privileges for the protection of the seaman which
are not cognizable in the common law. When he is sick or injured he is entitled to be
cared for at the expense of the ship, and for failure of the master to perform his duty in
this regard, the ship or the owner is liable. That is a right given to the seaman, and a
duty enjoined upon the master, by the plainest dictates of justice, which arises out of the
necessities of the case.. .. " For a discussion of criminal liability arising through neglect
of a master to rescue a seaman who fell overboard, see United States v. Knowles, 26
Fed. Cas. 800, No. 15540 (N.D. Cal. 1864).
20. 1 HAWKINS 92. The case is usually referred to as The Harlot's Case.
21. 14 CA. 2, c. 20 (1662), in 1 HAwKINs 652.
22. Id. at 681-85.




over the horizon. For it was in the latter half of the nineteenth century that
the great chain of regulatory statutes was initiated in England, which inau-
gurated a new era in the administration of the criminal law. Among them
are the Food and Drugs Acts,2 4 the Licensing Acts, 25 the Merchandise Marks
Acts, 20 the Weights and Measures Acts, 27 the Public Health Acts 28 and the
Road Traffic Acts.29 With these statutes came a judicial readiness to abandon
traditional concepts of mens rea and to base criminal liability on the doing of
an act, or even upon the vicarious responsibility for another's act, in the
absence of intent, recklessness or even negligence.30 The case usually cited
as the first powerful expression of this tendency is Regina v. Woodrow,3 '
where a tobacco dealer was convicted of possessing adulterated tobacco, al-
though he had bought it in the regular course of business and had no reason
to suspect impurity. Apparently, he could only have discovered the impurity
by procuring a complicated analysis; in the view of the court, this was not
an unreasonable demand to impose for avoidance of the penalty.3 2 America
witnessed a very similar development, beginning with a group of cases in
Connecticut and Massachusetts between 1850 and 1870. 3
Many of the public welfare offenses are ones of omission. Even where the
definition of the offense does not expressly impose a duty to take *positive
action, such a duty is often imposed by decisions like Regina v. Woodrow.
Strict liability has appeared harsh and futile in crimes of commission; it must
appear even more unattractive in offenses of omission, where the defendant
may be quite innocently unaware of circumstances requiring his action. In
some instances, courts have nevertheless employed notions of strict liability.
In Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dunning,34 for example, the appellants were
charged under the Motor Car Order of 1903, a set of regulations issued by
the Board of Trade, with failing to provide a vehicle with a rear light ade-
quate to illuminate the registration plate. The appellants had appointed an
24. A great many old statutes regulated sale procedures, but there seems to have
been no suggestion of strict liability until the nineteenth-century statutes. E.g., Sale of
Food and Drugs Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vicr. c. 63.
25. 35 & 36 Vicr. c. 94 (1872) ; 2 Ew. 7, c. 28 (1902) ; 10 EDw. 7 & 1 GEo. 5, c. 24
(1910) ; 11 & 12 GEo. 5, c. 42 (1921).
26. 50 & 51 Vicr. c. 28 (1887); 16 & 17 Gao. 5, c. 53 (1926).
27. 52 & 53 Vicr. c. 21 (1889); 16 & 17 Gao. 5, c. 63 (1926).
28. 38 & 39 Vicr. c. 55 (1875); 26 GEo. 5 & 1 EDw. 8, c. 49 (1936).
29. 59 & 60 Vicr. c. 36 (1896) ; 3 Eaw. 7, c. 36 (.1903) ; 20 & 21 GEo. 5, c. 43 (1.930).
30. For general discussions of this development, see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRImINAL LAv c. 10 (1947); WiLuiAms, CRIMINAL LAw c. 7 (1953); Sayre, Pliblic
Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLum. L. Rta. 55 (1933).
31 15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846), discussed in the works mentioned
in note 30 supra.
32. Id. at 412-13, 153 Eng. Rep. at 911.
33. 'See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849) ; Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84
Mass. (2 Allen) 160 (1861) ; Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 489 (1864).
See also Sayre, supra note 30.
34. [1909] 2 L.B. 599.
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employee to see that the regulations were complied with, but a cab driver
had apparently altered the position of his lamp so that it did not provide the
necessary light. The divisional court held that the appellants had been rightly
convicted of aiding and abetting the offense.3 5
In Quality Dairies (York) Ltd. v. Pedley,36 the appellants had been charged
under the Milk and Dairies Regulations, 1949, made under the Food and
Drugs Acts. The relevant regulation provided that: "Every distributor shall
ensure that every vessel . . . used for containing milk shall, immediately
before use by him, be in a state of thorough cleanliness . . . ." The defendants
had contracted to supply milk to hospitals but had subcontracted with another
dairy firm for one hospital. The milk was purchased by the second firm,
bottled on its premises and delivered by a haulage firm. At no time did any
of the defendant's employees handle the milk or the bottles. But the divisional
court held that the defendants could nevertheless be convicted for the unclean
state of one of the bottles.
American courts have at times been no kinder to the blameless defendant
in cases of criminal omissions. In City of Hays v. Schueler, the Kansas court
ruled that the duty to carry a red rear light on a motor vehicle was absolute
and could not be escaped by a showing that, despite all possible precautions,
the light had gone out.3 7 Similarly, State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co. held
that where the defendant company was liable for operating an auto stage
without a license, one of its employees might also be held criminally liable
although he had no knowledge that his employers had neglected to obtain
the license.38
In addition to the burgeoning of offenses of strict liability, the last century
witnessed a broadening of liability for homicide through failure to act. As
we saw, Coke did not discuss this possibility at all, and in Hawkins only a
hint is given in connection with the control of dangerous beasts. East's Pleas
of the Crown contains an emerging recognition of liability for homicide
through negligence. He writes:
"Accidents frequently occur amongst persons following their lawful occu-
pations, especially such from whence danger may probably arise. If they
saw the danger, and yet persisted without sufficient warning, it will be
murder. If the act were such as was likely to breed danger, and they
neglected the ordinary cautions, it will be manslaughter at least, on
account of such negligence; making due allowance for the nature of the
occupation, and the probability of the danger; which if very remote, and
35. WILLIA'S, CRIxIAL LAW 282 (1953), points out that the decision is no longer
good law in England, since it is now recognized that knowledge of the commission of an
offense by the principal is necessary to convict an aider or abettor. See Ferguson v.
Weaving, [1951] 1 K.B. 814; Thomas v. Lindop, [1950] 1 All E.R. 966 (K.B.).
36. [1952] 1 K.B. 275.
37. 107 Kan. 635, 193 Pac. 311 (1920). The court said: "The regulation falls ...
within the numerous class in which diligence, actual knowledge and bad motives are im-
material.... " Ibid.
38. 99 Wash. 64, 168 Pac. 893 (1917).
[Vol 67: 590
CRIMINAL OMISSIONS
in the particular instance not reasonably to be expected, may reduce the
act to misadventure. The criterion in such cases is to examine whether
common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a
more circumspect conduct."8 9
At the same time, the scope of a parent's duty to care for his child was
greatly extended, and liability for homicide was found in many cases of child
neglect. Moreover, the duty was extended to cover others than infant chil-
dren.40 The criminal courts were evidently becoming more conscious of the
positive burdens imposed by what East called "common social duty."
From these two streams, the public welfare offenses and the broader atti-
tude on liability in homicide, a wide area of duty to take positive action has
gathered in modern criminal law. Analysis of the concept of omission and
of the policy involved in an extension of liability for failure to act thus be-
comes necessary.
Tiag CONCEPT OF AN OMISSION
"An omission," wrote Stroud, "is not like an act, a real event, but is mere-
ly an artificial conception consisting of the negation of a particular act."
'41
By this is presumably meant that an act is sensible to feeling and to sight,
while an omission is not observable by the senses but is only a significance
legally attributed to passivity. Bishop, too, perhaps had this in mind when he
wrote: "A neglect is not properly an act, yet in a sense it is. It is a departure
from the order of things established by law. It is a checking of action; or it
is like the case of a man who stands still while the company to which he is
attached moves along, when we say, he leaves the company.1
42
These statements are valuable in pointing to the essential nature of an
omission, but they suffer from a failure to specify the exact sense in which
they use the idea of an act. "Act" must be defined before an omission can
be distinguished; and no agreed juristic concept of an act exists. Austin de-
fined an act as a motion of the body consequent upon a determination of the
will,43 but this approach implies a concept of volitions which has now been
sufficiently exploded by Professor Ryle.44 Holmes regarded an act as a
"voluntary muscular contraction," 45 which might be more acceptable, if "vol-
untary" is suitably defined. For the purposes of the criminal law, neither
definition is very helpful. The criminal law never prohibits mere muscular
contractions. It is not yet an offense to twitch. What the criminal law pro-
hibits is muscular contractions in certain circumstances and, perhaps, pro-
ductive of certain consequences. 6 The act of homicide in any particular in-
39. 1 EAST, PLE.AS OF THE CROWN 2W2 (1806).
40. See text at note 109 infra.
41. STRouD, MENs REA 4 (1914).
42. 1 BIsHop, CRIMINAL LAW § 433 (5th ed. 1872).
43. 1 AusTIN, JUISPRUDENcE 376 (1869).
44. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND passim (1950).
45. HoLmEs, THE Commox LAW 91 (1881.).
46. See DIAS & HUGHES, JURISPRUDENCE 202 (1957).
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stance must include the accompanying circumstance of the victim's existence
and the consequence of the victim's death. The only fruitful concept of an
act for the criminal law must synthesize the defendant's physical movements
with external accompanying circumstances and, sometimes, with certain con-
sequences.
And so with omissions. The definition of the specific offense must again
single out physical movement in accompanying circumstances and, possibly,
with certain consequences. It is not quite accurate to say, as Stroud did, that
an omission is not, like an act, a "real event." The legal notion of omission,
like that of an act, involves tangible happenings. Of course, in offenses which
are purely those of commission, such as rape, the criminal act occurs when
the general scheme of conduct projected by the statutory language is realized
in the particular by the physical movements of the defendant in appropriate
circumstances. In offenses purely of omission, such as misprision of treason,
the criminal occurrence is the failure of the defendant in appropriate cir-
cumstances to make concrete the general pattern of conduct prescribed by the
legal norm. The defendant may be acting constantly, but the legal significance
is attributed to the absence of particular action realizing the legal pattern.
There is a third possibility: the offense which in its legislative expression
seems prohibitive only, but which, by a process of judicial interpretation, has
come to be regarded as capable of perpetration by omission. An example is
homicide in a jurisdiction which refers only to the act of killing, as in New
York, but where the courts have shown willingness to apply liability to one
who causes death through neglect. No term of art in Anglo-American crim-
inal law describes the liability for such an offense incurred through a failure
to act. The French neatly call it "d6lit de commission par omission.
'47
The nature of certain offenses may make classification difficult. Examples
might be drawn from the offenses of practicing certain callings without a
license. Does the offense lie in practicing--commission--or in failing to ob-
tain a license? The question is clearly absurd for neither practicing nor fail-
ing to get a license is in isolation criminal. The offense is practicing without
a license and is committed by embarking on one course of conduct without
first doing something else. It therefore contains elements of commission and
omission. What the prosecution must show to obtain a conviction will con-
stitute an effective test: here, both facts-practicing and no license-are
necessary. The burden of showing a license may be on the defendant, but the
essential character of the absence of a license as an ingredient of guilt is not
thereby destroyed. The act receives a criminal color from a prior omission.
47. See ALBAR rWMoNTPEYROUX, L'INAcrioN Elm DRoIT PLNAL 85 (1944). The Ger-
mans call these offenses "unechte Unterlassungsdelikte." The usual example is homicide
by neglect, but it is not the only one. In Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 141 N.E.
510 (1923), the accused was indicted for burning a building with intent to injure the in-
surer. The evidence failed to show whether the accused had started the fire himself or
whether he had merely refrained from any attempt to extinguish it after it had started




The defendant could have escaped the penal provision either by obtaining a
license or by not practicing the calling. It is clearly the most tedious kind of
verbal dispute to argue about the proper description of his offense in terms
of action or omission. It is sufficient to notice that it contains elements of
both natures.
Possibly, of course, the lawmaker may have a choice of pursuing his chosen
policy by creating either an offense of commission or one of omission. But
only rarely can identical results be achieved. Thus, householders might be
required to set out garbage in specified receptacles between the hours of
9:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M., or the setting out of garbage between 7:00 A.M.
and 9:00 P.M. might be prohibited. But clearly, the alternative formulations
lead to different results. The first would seem to be a sanitary measure
designed to insure the collection and disposal of garbage, the second rather
to show concern for the defacement of streets in the daytime. To prohibit
from killing is very different from commanding the preservation of life.
Classification of Omissions
The criminal law may impose a duty to act under a variety of circum-
stances. The duty to embark upon physical activity only arises when the
particular surroundings envisaged by the notional pattern of conduct occur.
Here may be found a useful way of classifying offenses of omission. The
following categories are suggested.
In rare instances, a duty is geared by an event entirely unconnected with
the activity of the defendant. In this category are the duty to aid anyone in
peril, to be found in some European systems,48 the duty to report treason-
able activities and the duty to register for military service. Such duties are
imposed on the citizen solely by operation of law and because of his general
participation in community life. Second, the duty may be imposed by virtue
of a status relationship between individuals, as the duty of the husband to
protect his wife or the parent to care for his child. Here, an element of
voluntary assumption of the burden by the individual is apparent in his
entrance into the relationship or his, possibly intentional, fathering of children.
The status need not be domestic: the duty of the master, recognized by
common law, to care for his servant or the captain of a ship to care for the
crew might be included. As a third category, the duty may be imposed as a
result of the defendant's exercise of a privilege to practice a calling or en-
gage in a business or trade. Fourth, the duty may stem from the individual's
decision to participate in some permitted sphere of public activity, such as
the duty of those who have incomes to file tax returns or of those who drive
automobiles to carry certain equipment. In this field, certain special duties
may be imposed by the impingement of external events on the citizen in his
chosen sphere of activity. The accident in which the motorist is involved,
though none of his making, may place him under a duty to report to the
48. See text at note 145 infra.
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authorities or to render aid to the injured.49 These third and fourth cate-
gories include the great bulk of offenses of omission, and they reflect the
contemporary policy of approving the imposition of duties on those who elect
certain activities. Last is the duty to discharge properly burdens which one
has undertaken by contract or even gratuitously, where their neglect might
and does lead to death.50 This category includes liability for homicide through
negligent or reckless inactivity. Possibly, the proposition is true in other
crimes as well. If X is requested by Y to copy Y's will and deliberately
omits a provision, thus altering the effect of the will, he may well be guilty
of forgery.
This classification is probably neither exhaustive nor exclusive, but it does
indicate the sphere in which most present offenses of omission are found and
the policy which underlies their creation. To state that policy briefly, in the
immense complexity and interdependency of modern life, those who elect to
pursue certain activities or callings must, for the welfare of their fellow
citizens, submit to a host of regulations, some of which will naturally and
properly impose positive duties to act. That regulation through imposition
of positive duties should be increasing is not surprising. Whether the tradi-
tional processes of the criminal law are always the most suitable means of
insuring the observance of such regulation is more debatable.
Omissions and Mens Rea
Mens rea, which creaked through the criminal courts for centuries, has
recently been dug up, scrubbed, repainted and paraded for the admiration of
criminal lawyers. The old mumblings about "guilty mind" have been re-
placed by the ice-cutting concepts of intention and recklessness. And with
offenses of commission these new tools on the whole work very nicely. In
an offense of commission, the mind of the actor is almost always to some
extent addressed to the prohibited conduct, even though he may be unaware
of the legal prohibition. In these offenses, nens rea can quite usefully be
generalized as an intention to bring about the prohibited consequences or, at
the least, recklessness with regard to such consequences.r' With omissions,
49. !See text at note 64 infra. The duty may arise from the defendant's participating
in illegal activity, as with the duty imposed on felons in some communities to register
with the authorities. This is a complex example, as here the duty rests upon three prior
occurrences: embarking on criminal conduct by defendant; conviction by a court for
felony; and defendant's finding himself in the locality which imposes the duty to register.
See the discussion in text at note 100 infra of Lambert v. California, 78 Sup. Ct. 240
(1957).
50. "Everyone who undertakes to do an act is under a legal duty to do it if an omis-
sion to do the act is or may be dangerous to life." CAN. CRIM. CODE c. 51, § 188 (1953-
54).
51. "What, then, does legal iens rea mean? It refers to the mental element necessary
for the particular crime, and this mental element may be either intention to do the act
or bring about the consequence or (in some crimes) recklessness as to that consequence."
WiijuAms, CRimINAL LAw 29 (1953).
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the great difficulty is that the mind of the offender may not be addressed at
all to the enjoined conduct, if he is unaware of the duty to act. One may
not know that it is prohibited to place garbage cans on the sidewalk between
9:00 A.M. and 7:00 P.M., but one can hardly place such a can on the side-
walk without knowing that he is doing it. Rare cases of somnambulism or
insanity occur, but here the traditional approach is to deny liability on the
ground that the accused cannot be said to have performed any voluntary
act. 5 2 This approach is clearly of no use with omissions, where the accused
does not have to perform any act to incur liability. What of the offender
who violates a regulation requiring garbage to be put out in suitable recep-
tacles at certain times? If he was quite unaware of the existence of the rule,
in what sense can he be said to have been addressing his mind at all to the
conduct required of him by law? This is the difficulty which plagues the
analysis of omissions in terms of the conventional concepts of mens rea.
Let us consider the case of the pharmacist who is under a duty to register
the sale of all poisonous substances listed in a statutory catalogue. If he does
not register such a sale, there are many possible explanations. A few may be
suggested:
(1) He knows of the statutory rule and knows that the substance he is
selling is a poison within the meaning of the law but decides not to register
the sale.
(2) He has no knowledge of the existence of the rule and has never kept
a poison book.
(3) He knows of the rule and does keep a poison book, but he does not
know that the substance he is selling has been recently added to the list of
poisons within the meaning of the act.
(4) He is mistaken about the chemical nature of the substance and thinks
it is not a poison within the meaning of the act when in fact it is.
(5) He is undecided whether the substance comes within the meaning of
the act but neglects to resolve this doubt by consulting the act.
(6) He is undecided about the chemical nature of the substance but neg-
lects to resolve this doubt by further research and risks a sale without mak-
ing an entry in the poison book.
In an offense of commission, a solution might be reached by applying
concepts of intention, recklessness and perhaps negligence to the conduct
52. See, e.g., Rex v. Harrison-Owen, [1951] 2 All. E.R. 726 (Crim. App.), where the
accused was charged with burglary after being found in a house at night. He protested
that he had no recollection of having entered and that he must have been in a condition
of "automatism." After evidence of previous convictions for burglary was admitted, he
was convicted. In the Court of Criminal Appeal, evidence of previous convictions was
held admissible to rebut a defense of lack of iens rea when the actus reus has been
proved, but the prisoner's defense here was a denial of the act itself and the evidence was
therefore wrongly admitted against him. The conviction was quashed.
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prohibited. But with omissions, with the pharmacist, for example, the ap-
proach is senseless until an inquiry has been made into the state of his mind
about the duty to act, for until this knowledge is established, in no sense
can he be said to address his mind to the conduct enjoined.
Of the possible explanations of the pharmacist's omission, examples two.
three and five raise the question of the offender's ignorance of the existence
of the legal duty to act. In example two, he is quite ignorant of the exist-
ence of the duty. In example three, he knows of the general existence of
such a duty but is ignorant that it has recently been extended to cover the
substance with which he is dealing; and in example five he is doubtful about
the extent of the duty and neglects research.
In these circumstances, his liability should depend upon the culpability of
his ignorance which, in turn, should depend on the answer to several ques-
tions. What steps are taken by governmental agencies to bring the existence
of such duties and changes in their scope to the notice of pharmacists?
What likelihood is there. that by the nature of their activities pharmacists
should have knowledge of the existence of the duty? What special circum-
stances can the defendant show which might take him out of the normal ex-
pectation of knowledge in a pharmacist? Clearly, the pharmacist's state of
mind in example five should be no defense. There, he had a suspicion of
the applicability of the duty and elected to make no further investigation.
This might be called a reckless ignorance, a reckless refusal to consult easily
available information when a suspicion of duty to act had arisen. In example
two, it is difficult to imagine how a defendant engaged in the trade of phar-
macist could allege that complete lack of knowledge is not culpable. The
opportunities for acquiring this information must be so manifold that the
prosecution's burden of proof in showing culpable ignorance would be easily
discharged. Example three is the really interesting one, in that the defend-
ant's lack of knowledge is conceivably not culpable. Perhaps, the official
authority concerned neglected to inform the trade immediately of its new
regulation. No way may have been available to the pharmacist to acquire the
information, short of legal research.
The imposition of strict liability in such a situation is futile and distress-
ing. It can serve no purpose of deterrence, it protects the public in no way
at all and it contributes nothing to the strict enforcement of regulations. The
maxim, "ignorance of the law is no excuse," ought to have no application in
the field of criminal omissions, for the mind of the offender has no relation-
ship to the prescribed conduct if he has no knowledge of the relevant regu-
lation. The strictest liability that makes any sense is a liability for culpable
ignorance. We may say with some plausibility that the defendant ought to
be punished even though he did not know that he was supposed to do some-
thing, if he ought to have known that he should have done something. But
to find him liable whether he knew of the duty or not, and whether he ought
to have known of it or not, is to impose more than a strict liability. It is a
liability for a complete absence of relevant conduct. Such liability is indefen-
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sible even by the weak and compromised arguments which are convention-
ally used to justify strict liability in cases of commission.
The application of mens rea ideas to criminal omissions cannot, of course,
end with an investigation of the accused's knowledge or ignorance of the
duty to act. If knowledge or culpable ignorance of the law is found, a con-
ventional discussion, as with crimes of commission, of the accused's mental
state becomes necessary with respect to the physical circumstances under which
the duty arose.53 The pharmacist in examples four and six does not have
certain knowledge that the substance is chemically, not legally, within the
scope of the law. He knows the law but does not know that his present
situation brings him within its compass. Clearly, liability ought to be recog-
nized for recklessness, as in example six; and in the field of public welfare
offenses, a liability for negligence ought perhaps to be admitted. 4 For non-
culpable ignorance, it is submitted that there should be no liability.
The conventional analyses of mens rea in omissions suffer either from a
complete neglect of the aspect of ignorance of the law or a tendency to con-
fuse the two separate issues of ignorance of the duty and ignorance of the
circumstances which triggered the duty. So, Dr. Glanville Williams, in his
53. See Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 101, 93 S.W. 646, 648 (1906) : "One
cannot be said in any manner to neglect or refuse to perform a duty unless he has knowl-
edge of the condition of things which require performance at his hands." This statement
should be qualified by the remarks of the Louisiana court in State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434,
446, 52 So. 567, 572 (1910), that one is not "exculpated by his ignorance" if "he was
charged with the special duty of being informed."
54. "Recklessness" and "negligence" are used here in the senses indicated by WiL-
LIAmS, CRIMINAL LAW (1953): "In recklessness there is foresight of the possible con-
sequence of conduct .... It is like intention in that the consequence is foreseen, but the
difference is that whereas in intention the consequence is desired, or is foreseen as a
certainty, in recklessness it is foreseen as possible or probable but not desired." Id. at 49.
"A person may be held guilty of negligence although he did not foresee the risk of harm,
because his expectation did not accord with common experience; and he may also be held
guilty where he was unjustifiably ignorant of some circumstance that increased the risk."
Id. at 82.
The following definitions are offered in an unpublished Preliminary Draft of a Code
of Correction for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, prepared by Professor Donnelly of
the Yale Law School, July 1957:
"A state of mind is reckless towards an objective element of an offense when, if the
objective element is the actor's behavior or a result thereof, he is aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from his behavior and dis-
regards it. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature
and purpose of the actor's behavior and his awareness of the circumstances, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reason-
able person in his situation.
"A state of mind is negligent towards an objective element of an offense when the
actor should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the objective element
exists or will result from his behavior. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his behavior
and the circumstances known to him, involves a substantial deviation from the standard
of care that would be exercised by a reasonable person in his situation."
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admirable work on criminal law, treats this topic in a brief and unsatisfactory
way:
"There is some practical difficulty in classifying omissions as intentional
or negligent. In considering whether conduct is intentional it is un-
necessary to ascertain whether the party knew of the rule of law, and
whether (if he knew of it) he was adverting to it at the time in question.
Suppose, then, that a chemist, not knowing, or forgetting, that a par-
ticular, substance is a statutory poison, sells it without complying with
the Poisons Act. Is his omission to comply with the Act intentional or
negligent? The ordinary man would call it negligent, but in view of the
rule just stated (as to knowledge of the law) it would seem to be in-
tentional. He intentionally sells the drug without formality which is the
actus reus of the offence."
'5
Dr. Williams continues:
"It would seem that the practical test of intention in omission is as fol-
lows. If the defendant had been asked at any time while the omission
was continuing: 'Are you doing so-and-so?' (which the statute makes
it his duty to do), would the true answer based on the facts as he knows
them be: 'I am not'? If so, the omission is intentional. In effect this
makes intentional omission equivalent to conscious omission. Intention
is, however displaced by mistake, where the accused thinks that he is
doing the required act.""8
This is a very strange view of intention. If I am eating an orange in a chair
at home and someone asks me "Are you climbing Mount Everest?" I will
reply "No," but it would not seem very sensible to interpret this as mean-
ing that at the moment I was eating the orange I was intending not to be
climbing Mount Everest. When a legal concept strays so ludicrously far
from common understanding, the suspicion that something is wrong is justi-
fied. Dr. Williams goes on:
"The foregoing test assumes that intention is required to exist at the
moment of the legal omission, but there must be some qualificationi upon
this. If the accused, knowing that it will be his duty to act in five
minutes' time, allows himself to go to sleep, without intending to wake
up to perform his duty, the omission is clearly intentional, although
there is no mental state at the time when the omission takes place. Yet
it cannot be said that every omission during sleep is an intentional
omission. The only way of drawing the line is to say that the omission
is intentional if the accused, when he fell asleep, realised what his duty
was and that he was disabling himself from performing it. To this
extent a knowledge of the law is a requisite of viens rea.
''57
So, starting with a declaration that knowledge of the law is irrelevant to
intention, the learned author is later driven to admit that cases may exist in
which it is not sensible to speak of intention without taking into account





knowledge of the duty to act. But one may ask why he confines his reserva-
tion to the hypothetical case of the sleeper who does not awaken. In Dr.
Williams's analysis, the chemist who sells a poison not knowing that it is
covered by the statute is guilty of an intentional omission, while the man
who falls asleep, not knowing that he will be under a duty to act in five
minutes' time, is not. This analysis is misleading. The chemist's omission,
in Dr. Williams's analysis, is intentional not because he has knowledge of
the duty-he hasn't-but because he has knowledge of the activity-selling
the substance-which causes the duty to be imposed. The sleeper, too, has
no knowledge of the law. Accordingly, Dr. Williams's implication must be
that knowledge of the activity which gears the duty is sufficient to make the
omission intentional. If so, it is by no means certain that a man who falls
asleep not knowing that it will be his duty to act in five minutes is not guilty
of an intentional omission. For, although he does not know of the duty to
act, he may know that an event will occur in five minutes, and that event
may be the circumstance which causes the duty to be imposed. Why then
should his ignorance of the duty be relevant on Dr. Williams's analysis? His
position is no different from the chemist's before investigation of his knowl-
edge of the imminence of the event. To make his analysis consistent, Dr.
Williams should have maintained that the sleeper's intention will depend not
on his knowledge of an approaching duty to act when he fell asleep ,but on
his knowledge, when he fell asleep, of an approaching circumstance which,
unknown to him, imposes a duty to act. Dr. Williams is thus led into an
inconsistency by failing to take up a central position on ignorance of the law
in crimes of omission. 8
But these difficulties are more apparent than real. They are a revelation
of the unfortunate tendency which besets men generally and jurists in par-
ticular to construct generalizations from individual instances and then to
suppress or avoid the fresh instance which defies the generalization. The con-
cept of mens rea and its subconcepts, intention and recklessness, were con-
58. Though the language is rather obscure, SaROUD, MENs REA 5 (1914), while
avoiding the question of ignorance of law, seems more consistent in analysis: "An omis-
sion may be due to passivity, or to acts inconsistent with the act omitted. Cases of the
former kind, which are few and almost negligible, may be called passive omissions. Cases
where an omission is due to inconsistent action are frequent in occurrence, and are divis-
ible into two classes, according as the inconsistent acts committed are prior to or coin-
cident with the omission. In the former case the omission is nothing more or less than a
consequence of the acts preceding it. This distinction is of importance in the considera-
tion of any question as to whether an omission is intended or not. If the omission be
entirely attributable to present inconsistent action, or to mere passivity, intention consists
of advertence alone, the omission being intentional if the person adverts to the act omitted
and does some other act in lieu thereof, or remains passive. If, however, as would usually
be the case, the omission be due to prior inconsistent action, the omission being merely a
consequence of what has already been done, intention consists of advertence coupled with
ex-pectation, as in the case of any other consequence of an act done." But in most cases,
the person would probably not advert to the act omitted, unless he had a knowledge of
the duty to act.
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structed as generalizations of the instances of liability for offenses of com-
mission. They cannot be fluently applied to offenses of omission, and it is a
mistake to attempt to do so. The real concern should not be with the cir-
cumstances in which an omission may properly be described as intentional
but with those circumstances in which an omission is excusable or ought to
be excusable.
Professor H. L. A. Hart has argued that many legal concepts are only
understandable through a recognition of their "defeasible" character.50 By
this, he means that many legal concepts are attempts to state in an affirma-
tive generalization a collection of negative conditions which must be present
to invoke the appropriate rule. So a contract will be binding unless there is
undue influence, unless there is fraud or unless there is fundamental mis-
take. But we attempt to summarize these conditions which may defeat a
contract by an affirmative statement that consent must be free and full. So
in the criminal law, an act will be criminal unless the accused was insane,
acted under mistake of fact or, perhaps, was coerced. We tend to forget the
reality of this set of exemptive circumstances and impose upon them what
Professor Hart calls a "spurious unity" by stating generally that the accused's
act must be "voluntary," or that it must be "intentional" or "reckless." "In
order," Professor Hart writes, "to determine what 'foresight' and 'voluntari-
ness' are and how their presence and absence are established it is necessary
to refer back to the various defences and then these general words assume
merely the status of convenient but sometimes misleading, summaries, ex-
pressing the absence of all the various conditions referring to the agent's
knowledge or will which eliminate or reduce responsibility." 60
This thesis of Hart's is supported by the reflection, too rarely made ex-
plicit in works on criminal law, that the burden of proving mens rea is very
infrequently a real burden on the prosecution. In practice, the evidential
burden is usually on the defense to come forward with some evidence which
takes the accused out of the normal field of liability. And the main inquiry
should thus always be into the circumstances the law will permit the accused
to raise successfully as a defense and, of course, into the circumstances he
should be allowed to raise.
Again, a modern writer in the areas of philosophy and psychology, Pro-
fessor Ryle, has convincingly demonstrated that voluntariness is not a state
of mind or a mental operation but a concept of action in certain circum-
stances :61
"In their most ordinary employment 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are
used, with a few minor elasticities, as adjectives applying to actions
which ought not to be done. We discuss whether someone's action was
voluntary or not only when the action seems to have been his fault. He
59. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PRoCEEINis OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SociETy (n.s.) 171 (1948-49).
60. Id. at 181.
61. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 62-74 (1949).
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is accused of making a noise and the guilt is his, if the action was volun-
tary, like laughing; he has successfully excused himself if he satisfies
us that it was involuntary, like a sneeze."
62
Ryle goes on to submit that the decision whether an act was voluntary in
fact rests on whether the actor had the competence to do the right thing and
whether any external coercion prevented him from doing it.63 This is a thesis
of particular interest for the approach to omissions in the criminal law. If
we can reject the mesmerizing impact of the affirmative concepts of mens
rea and begin to approach the defendant's position by considering exactly
what he alleges by way of excuse, most of the difficulties will disappear.
SOME CASE LAW
An instructive area of inquiry lies in the duties imposed on motorists, by
legislation in most jurisdictions, to report an accident or to render assistance
to the victims. In England, the Road Traffic Act of 1930 requires that where
an accident occurs owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on the road
whereby damage or injury is caused, the driver must stop and give his name,
etc. to any person who has reasonable grounds for inquiring or report the
accident to the police within twenty-four hours.6 4 In Harding v. Price, the
divisional court was faced with an appeal from a conviction in the magis-
trates' court under this provision. 65 The accused's defense was that he had
no knowledge that an accident had occurred, since the impact was a slight
one and the noise in the cab of his truck was so great that he never heard
62. Id. at 69.
63. Id. at 69-74. See also Hart, supra note 59, at 180: "[Als can be seen from Aristotle's
discussion in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, the word 'voluntary' in fact serves to
exclude a heterogeneous range of cases such as physical compulsion, coercion by threats,
accidents, mistakes etc., and not to designate a mental element or state; nor does 'in-
voluntary' signify the absence of this mental element or state . . . ." Courts have often
perceived the sense of this approach. See State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 262, 40 Atl. 249, 254
(1897), where the court said, "If there is not capacity, means and ability to perform the
legal duty, the omission to perform is not criminal." See also the treatment of intention
in ANSCOmBE, INTENTiON (1957); Pasmore & Heath, Intentio r, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AmsTOTmiA.A SocIETY (supp. vol. 29) 131 (1955), and the judgment of Barry, J., in Rex
v. Charlson, [1955] 1 All E.R. 859 (Q.B.). An overly rigid approach to these concepts is
perhaps revealed by Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. Rlv. 905, 912 (1939) :
"If a watchman charged with the duty of lowering the gates at a crossing whenever a train
is approaching fails to do so on a particular occasion, with fatal consequences to a motorist,
the death is due to his (negative) act. But it would be absurd to speak of the act as
'voluntary' if he was inattentive and did not see the train approaching. As his legal duty
required him to be attentive in this regard his want of knowledge of the need for im-
mediate action will not excuse him, but it leaves his failure wholly unintentional." An
unnecessary equation of "voluntary" with "intentional" appears here. The real point is
that in Perkins's example the criminal law seems to attach liability to simple negligence;
whether the description "voluntary" is applied to negligent conduct is not very important.
64. 20 & 21 Gao. 5, c. 43, § 22 (1930).
65. [1948] 1 K.B. 695.
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or felt it. The prosecution relied heavily on the argument that the word
"knowingly," which had appeared in the corresponding section of the earlier
Motor Car Act of 1903, was omitted in the Road Traffic Act and that this
deletion indicated a legislative purpose to create an offense of strict liability.
The divisional court refused to accept the prosecution's view. The con-
viction was quashed on the ground that while offenses of commission may
be construed as ones of strict liability, this inference should not be drawn so
readily in offenses of omission, even in the absence of statutory language
indicating need for proof of knowledge. The Lord Chief Justice said:
"If, apart from authority, one seeks to find a principle applicable to this
matter it may be thus stated: if a statute contains an absolute prohibition
against the doing of some act, as a general rule mens rea is not a con-
stituent of the offence; but there is all the difference between prohibit-
ing an act and imposing a duty to do something on the happening of a
certain event. Unless a man knows that the event has happened, how can
he carry out the duty imposed? If the duty be to report, he cannot re-
port something of which he has no knowledge."66
The court relied upon the earlier case of Nichdls v. Hall.6 7 There, the accused
was acquitted of failing to report a contagious disease in one of his animals
when he did not know that the animal was infected. The prosecution's point
about the change in statutory language was met by the argument that at
most the omission of "knowingly" only affected the burden of proof; al-
though formerly the prosecution might have had to show knowledge, the
burden was now on the accused to show an absence of knowledge.
This decision must be wholly welcome, for a conviction on such facts
would be a profitless legal operation. Unfortunately, the divisional court was
not so courageous when faced a few years later with a more subtle variation
on the theme, in Quelch v. Phipps.68 Here the same Lord Chief Justice
who had created the principle in Harding v. Price refused to apply it to
slightly different circumstances. One of the passengers of the defendant-bus
driver had attempted to get off the bus when the driver was slowing down
for a red light. The attempt was rash, and the passenger was injured. The
conductor informed the driver of the accident, the driver stopped, and the
conductor escorted the injured passenger home. The passenger was not sup-
plied with the information required by the Road Traffic Act, and the driver
did not report the accident to the police, though the conductor did report it
two days later. The magistrates' court acquitted the driver on the ground
that the statute's use of the word "accident" contemplated some sort of col-
lision; however, the divisional court took the view that the accident was of
a kind embraced by the statutory language, "owing to the presence of a
motor vehicle on the road," and the appeal of the prosecution succeeded.
66. Id. at 701.
67. L.R. 8 C.P. 322 (1873).
68. [1955] 2 Q.B. 107.
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Harding v. Price was distinguished since, here, the driver did know that an
accident had occurred.
Clearly, the driver knew someone was hurt, and he knew exactly how he
was hurt. His defense may be expressed as a lack of knowledge that these
physical happenings triggered the duty to report. Although generally aware
of the duty to report accidents and under no misapprehension about the
physical facts, he did not regard this as an accident. He is in the position
of the pharmacist who knew of the duty to record the sale of poisons but
did not know that the law regarded the substance with which he was dealing
as a poison. The pharmacist's ignorance in the example might have been
nonculpable, at least morally, if the substance had recently been added to the
poison list and no steps had been taken to bring this to the notice of phar-
macists. On the other hand, he might have been clearly negligent in not
keeping up with official circulars. In Quelch v. Phipps, the position of the
defendant was a little different, since he had no official list to consult to
determine readily what was and what was not an accident. Is his mistake of
law to be regarded as culpable? The duty to report accidents, one might
argue, is so socially pressing that anyone who is involved in a situation where
the slightest suspicion of the applicability of the legal duty might occur to a
reasonable man fails to act at his peril. The decision is perhaps justifiable on
this ground, but disappointingly it holds that mistake of this sort can never
be a defense. One may be able to afford the luxury of the defendant who is
surprised to learn that he has not committed a crime when he was fairly
confident that he had. It is much more disturbing to find the innocent
defendant, who mistakenly believed that the law did not impel him to act,
convicted on the ground that he could not accurately forecast the divisional
court's view of what is an accident. At the least, one hopes that steps have
now been taken to instruct bus drivers in the implications of this decision.
The divisional court, which took a sensible step in restricting strict lia-
bility in Harding v. Price on a question of ignorance of fact, failed to act
in the same way on a question of mistake of law in Quelch v. Phipps.69 The
approach ought to be the same in both cases; liability should rest on the
culpability of the defendant's lack of knowledge or mistake. The divisional
court may, of course, advance for the future an interpretation of the Road
Traffic Act which would support a defendant's conviction in a Quelch v.
Phipps situation. But such a conclusion need not logically entail a finding of
guilt in the particular defendant, in his condition of reasonable mistake at
a time before the interpretation was advanced.
The American jurisdictions have also generally demanded that the defend-
ant have knowledge of an accident before conviction will lie for evasion of
69. An invaluable survey of theories and practice of denying ignorance of the law as
a defense is Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 421
(1957). See also Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Crininal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1 (1957);
and the symposium on this topic, 26 REVUE INmxRNATIoNALE DE DROIT PANAL 293-352
(1955).
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responsibility. Some states expressly include the word "knowingly" in the
definitions of these offenses ;7o others have come to require knowledge through
case law alone. So, in an early case, the Texas court suggested that lack of
knowledge would be a good defense, though the local statute did not speci-
fically require knowledge:
"Appellant complains that the indictment is defective in not alleging that
accused 'knowingly' struck the party injured . . . We cannot agree to
this contention. The word 'knowingly' or 'knowing' does not appear in
the description of the act denounced as an offence, and it is not necessary
for the State so to allege. If it becomes an issue on the trial, lack of
knowledge on the part of a defendant that he had injured someone
would excuse him and be a defense to a prosecution .... "71
The Virginia 72 and California courts have also accepted lack of knowledge
as a defense in the absence of specific statement in the statutes. Some of
the California cases are worthy of special notice. In People v. Graves, for
instance, the trial judge had charged the jury that: "The duty imposed upon
a driver of an automobile which strikes a person . . . is a duty which he
must perform in all cases . . . . 73 The defendant asserted that this would
seem to impose a duty even in the absence of knowledge of collision and
was therefore prejudicial error. The court agreed that the legislature could
not have intended the statute to apply to one without knowledge but felt
that a jury could not conceivably convict a man who had no knowledge; it
therefore affirmed the conviction on the ground that the defendant's inter-
pretation of the instruction was unreasonable. This approach is even more
marked in People v. Rallo.74 In that case, a conviction was reversed and a
new trial ordered on the ground of misdirection, in spite of the showing that
the defendant had good reason to suspect that his car had run over someone.
The faulty instruction was identical with that in the Graves case, but the
court felt that the necessity for knowledge must be made explicit in the
directions. In the court's view, the gist of the offense was willful omission
to render reasonable assistance; thus, failure to express the necessity for
knowledge in the directions amounted to an omission of an essential ingre-
dient of the offense.
75
70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2410, 2493 (1949).
71. Scott v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 100, 105, 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921).
72. Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 38 S.E.2d 328 (1946).
73. 74 Cal. App. 415, 417, 240 Pac. 1019, 1020 (1925).
74. 1.19 Cal. App. 393, 6 P.2d 516 (1931).
75. See also People v. Dallas, 42 Cal. App. 2d 596, 109 P.2d 409 (1941); People v.
Odom, 19 Cal. App. 2d 641, 66 P.2d 206 (1937) ; People v. McKee, 80 Cal. App. 200, 251
Pac. 675 (1926). In People v. Bowlin, 19 Cal. App. 2d 397, 65 P2d 840 (1937), the
defendant attacked the constitutionality of the California enactment on the ground that it
tended to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, since it did not affirmatively
insist on knowledge as an element of liability. It was held that the defect, if any, was
cured by judicial insistence on knowledge in applying the statute. On this point, see
Lambert v. California, 78 Sup. Ct. 240 (1957). The constitutionality of this provision
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One of the more interesting California cases is People v. Henry.76 The de-
fendant-driver struck and killed a truck driver who was standing by the side
of his disabled vehicle. The defendant did not stop and, when accosted by a
patrol car, gave a false explanation of the damage to his car. At the trial,
the defendant alleged that he had been in a state of amnesia or fugue during
the period when the accident occurred. He appealed his conviction on the
ground that, since his amnesia was not disproved by the prosecution, the
state had failed to discharge its burden of showing knowledge. The court
took the view that a defense like the accused's could not be sustained where
there were no witnesses to the accident and the evidence "overwhelmingly
indicated" that the defendant's automobile was involved in an accident. The
trial court had properly called the jury's attention to the requirement that
the defendant have knowledge and that it be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. And the jury was not bound to accept the defendant's story.
This decision seems to stand for the proposition that the burden of coming
forward with evidence on the knowledge question is on the defense. But the
court properly indicated that the ultimate burden is on the prosecution to show
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury may balance the defendant's
story against the circumstantial or direct evidence of knowledge, but it should
not find against him unless satisfied of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.
Perhaps some danger arises from the court's view that a defense of lack of
knowledge cannot be sustained where there are no witnesses of the accident.
What if, in this case, the defendant had been able to call convincing medical
testimony of his susceptibility to states of fugue or amnesia? In such circum-
stances, he might well inject a reasonable doubt and be entitled to a verdict.
In all these cases, with the exception of Quelch v. Phipps, the question
has been the defendant's knowledge of the physical circumstances which gear
the duty, not knowledge of the duty itself. A motorist could scarcely allege
that he did not know of the duty to report an accident or render assistance.
Yet a great many motorists may in fact be unaware of these duties. Why,
then, should ignorance be so unthinkable as a defense? Presumably, the
answer is that the motorist should make it his business to be informed about
this kind of duty; thus, the nonculpability of ignorance is hardly a conceiv-
able possibility. A motorcar is a lethal instrument; those who drive should
ascertain the extent of the legal obligations which this activity may impose
on them, as far as reasonably practical. But the question also arises whether
enough is done by official agencies to bring to motorists notice of the full
range of duties which the law places upon them.77
has also been attacked, unsuccessfully, on the ground that the requirement that informa-
tion of accidents be lodged with the authorities amounts to a compulsion to be a witness
against oneself. See People v. Diller, 24 Cal. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797 (1914).
76. 23 Cal. App. 2d 155, 72 P.2d 915 (1937).
77. The British Highway Code, issued to all applicants for a driving test leading to
a license, contains at 26 a section headed "The Law's Demands" which summarizes the
statutes and regulations which may impinge on the motorist.
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Agreement seems fairly general, on the other hand, that liability should
not be imposed on the motorist who is ignorant of the occurrence of an
accident, a holding reached even by jurisdictions such as California and Eng-
land which have enactments on the point containing no express reference to
knowledge. A question may arise here of a shift in the burden of introducing
evidence: in those states where the statute does not refer to knowledge, the
burden of introducing evidence is on the defense; in those jurisdictions where
knowledge is expressly demanded by the regulation, the burden on the pros-
ecution may be somewhat more difficult to discharge.
Tax Cases
The basis of liability for an omission has been much discussed under the
income tax statutes. Section 145(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
made it a misdemeanor willfully to fail to pay estimated tax, make returns,
keep records or supply information. And section 145(b) created a felony:
a willful "attempt in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
title." In United States v. Murdock, the defendant had refused to give in-
formation about claims for deductions in his tax returns on the ground that
to give such information would be self-incriminatory.78 Defendant's convic-
tion by the district court was reversed in the court of appeals, and the matter
came before the Supreme Court on certiorari. There, the decision of the court
of appeals was affirmed; the defendant could incur no liability until his lack
of constitutional privilege had been determined and followed by a refusal to
supply information. Congress did not intend, the Court felt, that a person
should incur liability for failure to meet a prescribed standard of conduct
when the failure was due to a bona fide misunderstanding of his legal posi-
tion. The prosecution's burden was to show more than a voluntary omission.
The implication of this decision, that mistake of law is a defense to a
failure to act, at any rate where that failure is qualified as "willful" in the
governing enactment, is welcome. The decision can be instructively compared
with Q uelch v. Phipps. In both cases, the defendant was aware of the exist-
ence of a duty to act but believed that the law did not attach the duty to
him in his position. In Murdock, the defendant's attention was of course ex-
pressly drawn to the existence of the duty, but he relied on his own judg-
ment that he was exempted. In Quelch v. Phipps, the defendant may not
have expressly adverted to the duty, though he presumably had knowledge
of it and though a reasonable man in his position might have contemplated
the possibility of its relevance. Again, in both cases, the applicability of the
relevant duty to the defendant was in fact undetermined when he neglected
to act and was only settled by the decision of the court in the defendant's
own trial process. Unhappily, the English divisional court refused to weigh
78. 290 U.S. 389 (1933). This was a prosecution under the Revenue Act of 1926,
§ 1114(a), 44 STAT. 116, and the Revenue Act of 1928, § 146(a), 45 STAT. 835 (later Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 145(a), 53 STAT. 62; now see INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 7201).
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the culpability of defendant's failure to anticipate a given view of the law
and closed its eyes altogether to the possible appropriateness of such a de-
fense. The Supreme Court, much more sensibly, held defendant's bona fide
belief a good defense. But the usefulness of bona fides as a criterion may be
questioned in this context. A man is either mistaken or he is not. He is
either ignorant or he is not. How can one be ignorant or mistaken dishonest-
ly? The sensible criterion is surely the reasonableness of mistake or ignor-
ance.70 A person may clearly be recklessly mistaken or ignorant because he
has neglected to contact readily available sources of information or consulta-
tion. The criterion of liability might well be reckless mistake, or at most
negligent mistake. So viewed, both Murdock and Quelch v. Phipps should
have resulted in acquittal, future compliance with the law being insured by
a proper dissemination of information by government agencies on the scope
of the duty in such cases.
The tax cases also contain an interesting illustration of the significance
which courts are sometimes willing to attribute to the distinction between
offenses of omission and those of commission. The misdemeanor under sec-
tion 145 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code consists of willful omission, while
the felony under section 145(b) lies in a willful attempt to evade or defeat
the payment of tax. A question frequently raised is whether willful omission
or a series of willful omissions can constitute willful attempt to evade. In
Spies v. United States, the defendant, who admitted that he had neglected
to file a tax return, pleaded at his trial that his physical illness during the
relevant period should be taken into consideration."' He was nevertheless
convicted of the felony of willful attempt, under the charge to the jury: "[I]f
you find that the defendant willfully failed to file an income tax return for
that year, if you find that the defendant willfully failed to pay the tax due
• . . you may, if you find the facts and circumstances warrant . . . find that
the defendant willfully attempted to defeat or evade the tax." The court re-
fused a requested instruction that an affirmative act was necessary to con-
stitute a willful attempt. The Supreme Court took the view that liability
under the felony clause demanded proof of more than omissions sufficient
for liability under the misdemeanor clause. The attempt was an independent
crime, requiring proof of affirmative action.
The significance of the Spies case can be confined to the necessary impli-
cation of the Internal Revenue Code, which, by separating the offense of
felony from that of misdemeanor, presumably required proof of something
more to constitute the graver offense. However, the decision may be taken
to reflect the underlying assumption of western morality and jurisprudence
that omission is a less heinous mode of conduct than commission. 8' Dr.
79. Of course, an argument may be advanced for allowing any mistake of law as a
defense, but this seems an undue relaxation.
80. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
81. Kirchheimer, Crimzial Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REv. 615, 616 (1942), points out
that medieval theologians, notably Aquinas, took the view that positive action must be
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Glanville Williams takes the view that criminal attempts in general always
require the commission of an affirmative act and that an omission is never a
sufficient ground of liability. 2 The policy of this approach is questionable.
Nothing in the potentially harmful effects of failures to act entitles omissions
to more lenient treatment than commissions. That liability should not be
imposed where the defendant is innocently ignorant of the circumstances
which require him to act or of the presence of the duty requiring action is
a most desirable rule, but in the absence of these exculpatory circumstances,
no pressing need for lenient treatment appears. If a completed crime is capa-
ble of commission by omission, an attempt should also be. If a parent's failure
to feed his child so that the child dies is homicide, why should it not be
attempted homicide for the parent to fail to feed the child so that the child
is in danger of death and would have died but for intervention? The present
penal policy of omissions vacillates between an unjustifiable general feeling
that omissions are less heinous than commissions on the one hand and a
refusal to admit legitimate defenses to statutory crimes of omission on the
other. Indeed, the Spies principle has not worked out too happily in later
cases.8 3 The courts have been driven to uphold the position that the man
who successfully contrives to make no tax returns at all for a number of
years is guilty of a smaller offense than the man who willfully misstates his
income once when he makes a return. The. practical damage is probably
slight, since the man making no returns will in the nature of things almost
certainly be guilty of affirmative acts which bring him under the felony
clause, but the theoretical structure of the provisions is clearly unreasonable.
Omissions may often be more damaging and just as reprehensible as com-
missions.
Observable Trends and Some Suggestions
At this point, two conclusions should have emerged. First, no sufficient
awareness has yet developed of the potential harmful effects of failure to act;
consequently, a legislative and judicial tenderness to offenses of omission,
further removed from virtue than simple absence of good conduct. But see LACTANTIUS,
INSTITUT. DIviNAE bk. V1, c. 2: "Qid succurrere perituro potest si non succurrerit.
occidit."
82. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 476-77 (1953). But see the same author's SANcnTY
oF LIFE AND TE CRIMINAL LAW 274 n.2 (1957), where the suggestion is made that some
situations occur in which failure or refusal to act might constitute attempted suicide, still
a criminal offense in England.
83. See Cave v. United States, 159 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Croes-
sant, 178 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1949). Professor Bittker of the Yale Law School has pointed
out to the author that for some purposes the Internal Revenue Code does attach peculiar
significance to omissions. For example, no limitation period is granted for civil liability
for a complete failure to file tax returns, while for a nonfraudulent return the period of
three years' limitation applies. Again, there is a special limitation period of six years
for an omission to disclose more than 25% of a gross income. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 6501(a), (c) (3), (e) (1) (a).
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not always justified by the circumstances, is still to be found. Second, a
partial refusal exists to recognize the necessity of abandoning conventional
attitudes to ignorance of the law as a defense in the cases of omission; this
refusal extends even to ignorance of fact about the circumstances giving rise
to the duty to act. The law thus vacillates between excessive lenity and ex-
cessive rigor. To be sure, many jurisdictions have begun to be aware of the
peculiarity of omissions when confronted by defenses of mistake or ignor-
ance. But examples may still be found of a blind adherence to the worst
extremes of strict liability. So, in State v. Masters, a prosecution was brought
under a West Virginia statute imposing liability on the driver of an auto-
mobile who failed to stop after striking a person . 4 The defendant argued
that the indictment was defective, for it failed to allege his knowledge of the
accident. Denying defendant's appeal, the court said:
"The statute in the instant case does not make knowledge of the accident
a part of the offence, and, under the general rule, it is not necessary for
the State to so allege. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the very
object of the statute, namely, the protection of the person and property
of the traveling public from motorists who seek to dodge all responsi-
bility in cases of accidents on the highway to which they are parties. In
most cases it would be impossible for the State to prove scienter beyond
a reasonable doubt, while the accident itself might properly be proven."' ' 5
The policy advocated in this passage seems perversely applied. Surely, the
release from liability of those who do not know that they have been in an
accident cannot possibly defeat the object of protecting those who are in-
jured. Will convictions in such cases insure that in future those who do not
know they have been involved in an accident will stop? And the difficulty
of proving knowledge is much exaggerated. It has not troubled those juris-
dictions which insist on knowledge and seems perfectly susceptible of solution
by allowing the prosecution to raise an inference of knowledge from the cir-
cumstances of the accident, thus placing the burden of introducing evidence
in dispute on the defendant. Possibly, the Masters case would no longer be
followed in West Virginia, though it has never been expressly repudiated.
What is needed is a highly organized dissemination of information about
the duties which the law imposes on those who are engaged in special fields
of activity. This feature of penal law enforcement was long ago recognized
by Max Ernst Mayer.8 6 He distinguished between the major crimes in a
penal system, the wrongfulness of which has become common knowledge
through cultural heritage, and, on the other hand, the mass of regulatory
offenses which are "culturally indifferent." This sounds at first like the old
84. 106 W. Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928). The statute is to be found in W. VA. CoDE
c. 46, § 97 (Barnes 1923). The case is discussed in Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law
WVithout It, 58 W. VA. L. Rxv. 34, 54-55 (1955).
85. 106 W. Va. at 48, 144 S.E. at 718.
86. MAYER, R cHTSNORmEN UND KULTURNOnrEN (1903), discussed in MuELLER,
MEs REA AND THE PENAL LAW WITHOUT IT (unpublished thesis in Columbia Law
School Library 1955). This account of Mayer is taken from Mr. Mueller's thesis.
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and discredited distinction between inala in se and mnala prohibita, but Mayer's
approach does not require the belief that some offenses deal with conduct as
legally prohibited. The difficulty of distinguishing between conduct which is
inherently wrong and conduct which is only wrong relative to a given time,
place and culture may be accepted, yet Mayer's point that certain crimes by
their immemorial prohibition in a community have seeped into the communal
awareness with the stamp of wrongfulness still holds. Lundstedt and other
Scandinavian jurists contend that morality is more the product of law en-
forcement than the law is the product of morality.8 7 This position is also
compatible with Mayer's contention that the antiquity of the prohibition and
its immemorial connection with severe punishment of the offender can pro-
duce a communal reaction to the act which becomes a part of general senti-
ment and awareness. With such crimes, Mayer contends, the conventional
canons of guilt, intention or recklessness are adequate. But with the cultural-
ly indifferent offenses-the public welfare offenses-the chief criterion should
be knowledge of the legal norm or, at least, negligence in the lack of knowl-
edge. To further this policy he suggested a program of information through
local announcements, a listing of laws on license certificates and the like.
Mayer intelligently anticipated a problem which was later to become more
acute. In England and America, concern has been growing about the tech-
niques of publicizing legislation, particularly delegated legislation. The prob-
lem is now dealt with in England by the Statutory Instruments Act of 1946
which provides that, where any person is charged with an offense under a
statutory instrument, it shall be a defense to prove that the instrument had
not been issued by the Stationery Office at the date of the alleged contra-
vention, unless it is proved that at that date reasonable steps had been taken
for the purpose of bringing the purport of the instrument to the notice of the
public, or of persons likely to be affected by it, or of the person charged.
8 8
In America, the debate engendered by the Hot Oil case 89 provoked the
passage of the Federal Register Act ;90 and, in the Administrative Procedure
Act, the provision is now found that: "No person shall in any manner be
required to resort to organization or procedure not . . . published [in the
Federal Register]."91 But provision for publication is not enough in itself.
Since the Federal Register Act, two cases have arisen in which the relevant
regulation did not come to the notice of the appropriate governmental or
judicial body ;92 and, in one of these cases, the failure led to a most unhappy
87. See LUNDSTEDT, SUPERSTITION OR RATIONALITY IN ACTION FOR PEACE passhn
(1925); LuNDSTEDT, LAW AND JUSTICE (ACTA INsTITUTI UPSALIENSIS IURISPRUDENTIAR
ComPARAT vAE 1 1952) ; OLIVEcRONA, LAW AS FACT passin. (1939).
88. 9 & 10 GEO. 6, c. 36, § 3(2) (1946). See H. PHinLiPs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH 326 (1952).
89. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
90. 49 STAT. 500 (1935), as amended, 44 U.S.C. §§ 301-14 (1952).
91. 60 STAT. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1952).
92. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Gibson v. United
States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946).
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finding against a petitioner in a court of appeals, followed by a confession of
error by the government before the Supreme Court.9 3 What is needed is not
mere publication but also organized dissemination to the interested bodies
and parties. For different bodies, different forms of dissemination will be
appropriate. As one commentator observes in a stimulating discussion:
"In publishing rules the Government must consider the needs of laymen,
as well as the needs of lawyers and other specialists who advise laymen.
Rules governing rent control, for example, though frequently the con-
cern of lawyers and real-estate agents, have more often concerned land-
lords and tenants who had no counsel. In addition, the requirements of
officials who administer the rules must be met."
94
A good deal of this kind of activity goes on already. Some of it is con-
ducted by government agencies in official circulars, some of it by private
enterprise, as in trade journals. But doubt persists whether the effort is
sufficiently organized or intense. The citizen, of course, has a duty to take
active steps to familiarize himself with the regulations governing his chosen
field of activity, but the government should surely go at least halfway. At a
minimum, equal official zeal is necessary to acquaint him with the duties he
must observe.
The extreme forms of strict liability with respect to ignorance or mistake
of fact are now on the wane. In England, this recoil has come in two ways:
first, by the increasingly common legislative practice of inserting in statutes
possible defenses of all due diligence,95 bona fide mistake or accident, 96 or
procedures for interpleading third parties ;97 and, second, by an increasing
93. Id. at 341 n.4.
94. Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of
Federal Regulations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 929, 931 (1950). See also Bailey, The Promiul-
gation of Law, 35 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 1059 (1941); Griswold, Govenmtent in Igiorance
of the Lawj--A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV.
198 (1934); Jaffe, Publication of Administrative Rules and Orders, 24 A.B.A.J. 393
(1938) ; Ronald, Publication of Federal Administrative Legislation, 7 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 52 (1938).
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950), the
Supreme Court said: "Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes
his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the infor-
mation will never reach him are large indeed."
95. An early example is the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vicr. c. 28.
96. See the Sale of Food (Weights and Measures) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 GEO. 5, c. 63,
§ 12(2).
97. See the Food and Drugs Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. 6, c. 56, § 83. These acts are dis-
cussed in WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 241-45 (1953). An interesting example of such a
legislative mollification is the West German practice in the field of economic crimes,
where the defendant is allowed to show in excuse a nonculpable error about the applica-
bility of the violated norm-a perfect solution for such cases as Quelch v. Phipps. See
Economic Penal Law of 1949, Wi GBL 27/193 (now WIRTSCEAFTSSTRAFGESETZ 1954,
BGBI 1, 175), discussed in MuELLER, op. cit. supra note 86, at 104.
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judicial reluctance to dispense with inens rea.9 8 Also needed is a compromise
procedure between the rigid dualism of penal conviction or acquittal. The
possibility of official warning or serving of official notice suggests itself. Rare-
ly, something of the sort is already found. West Virginia, which perpetrated
the lamentable statement of principle in the Masters case, redeemed itself to
some extent by providing that state personnel shall be empowered to stop
vehicles suspected of being improperly equipped. An inspection follows and,
if the vehicle is found defective, an order is made that the defect must be
remedied within five days and that the vehicle must then be submitted to a
further inspection. If the vehicle is not so submitted or if the defect is un-
repaired, criminal liability follows.99 The procedure is perhaps not conscious-
ly directed at those who are in ignorance of the relevant duties, but it con-
tains a mechanism which could be very appropriately applied to such persons.
Although this discussion relates generally to strict liability in public wel-
fare offenses, it has a particularly sharp reference to offenses of omission.
Here, where there is no question of action and where the mind of the de-
fendant may be innocently unaware of the duty to act, the need is pressing
for a recognition that the ancient legal dualism of conviction and acquittal
must be supplemented by an administrative procedure which is, initially at
least, outside the area of the conventional criminal process. This need has
now received at least partial recognition from the United States Supreme
Court in Lambert v. California.'°0 The appellant had been convicted under
a provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code which required anyone who
had been convicted in any place of an offense punishable as a felony in Cali-
fornia to register with the police within five days of entering the city.1 1' The
appellant at her trial had contended that the section denied her due process
of law. By a majority of five to four, the Supreme Court held that the ordi-
nance, as applied to the appellant, violated the due process requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Douglas, proceeds squarely on
the distinction between offenses of commission and those of omission. The
Court assumed appellant's ignorance of the duty to register, since her offer
of proof in this regard had been rejected. "[W] e deal here with conduct that
is wholly passive-mere failure to register. It is unlike the commission of
acts or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to
the consequences of his deed."'01 2 While strict liability for a failure to register
98. See, e.g., Wilson v. Inyang, [1951] 2 K.B. 799; Younghusband v. Luftig, [1§491
2 K.B. 354; Harding v. Price, [1948] 1 K.B. 695. The United States Supreme Court
gave powerful expression to this tendency in Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952).
99. See discussion of this provision in Mueller, Mens Rea ajid the Law Without 1t,
58 W. VA. L. RE., 34, 62-63 (1955).
100. 78 Sup. Ct. 240 (1957).
101, Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 52.38(a), 52.39, 52A3(b).
102. 78 Sup. Ct. at 243.
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might be properly imposed where the duty was stimulated by the defendant's
embarking on a course of activity of a special nature, strict liability could
not exist where the duty arose on mere presence in a locality. The fact that
the appellant was given no opportunity to comply with the law when she
became aware of the duty to register impressed the Court: "We believe that
actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such
knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a convic-
tion under the ordinance can stand."'10 3
A dissent was recorded, written by Justice Frankfurter with Justices Har-
lan and Whittaker joining. 0 4 Unimpressed by the majority's distinction be-
tween offenses of omission and those of commission, Justice Frankfurter
said: "But what the Court here does is to draw a constitutional line between
a State's requirement of doing and not-doing. What is this but a return to
Year Book distinctions between feasance and nonfeasance-a distinction that
may have significance in the evolution of common-law notions of liability,
but is inadmissible as a line between constitutionality and unconstitutional-
ity."''10 However, that this was the distinction drawn by the majority is not
at all clear. Nothing in the majority judgment leads to the conclusion that
ignorance of the law must always be admitted as a defense to any crime of
omission. Rather, the opinion carefully confines its remarks to the omission
where the duty to act arises only because of a person's presence in a certain
locality.
Two questions must be kept separate. The first is the advisability of legis-
lative policy creating criminal registration statutes and the advisability of
judicial policy applying them along lines of strict liability. The second ques-
tion is that of constitutionality. The majority opinion in the Lambert case
admirably perceives the dangers of strict liability notions in such an area.
But as a text for establishing a principle of unconstitutionality, it is more
controversial. What is the principle? Is it generally applicable to all offenses
of omission, as Justice Frankfurter seemed to think? Or, is it confined to
duties to act imposed on those who find themselves in a locality? Justice
Frankfurter said: "If the generalization that underlies, and alone can justify,
this decision were to be given its relevant scope, a whole volume of the
United States Reports would be required to document in detail the legisla-
tion in this country that would fall or be impaired."'1 6 But what generaliza-
tion underlies the majority decision and what legislation Justice Frankfurter
103. Ibid. It may be doubted whether the demand here for proof of "actual knowledge
of the duty" or "the probability of such knowledge" is the happiest formulation. Is this
to be taken as requiring a less severe standard of proof than the usual proof beyond a
reasonable doubt? A demand for proof of knowledge or culpable ignorance would seem
a better rule.
104. Id. at 244. Justice Burton dissented separately on the ground that, as applied
to the appellant, the ordinance did not violate her constitutional rights.
105. Ibid.
106. Id. at 245.
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had in mind are not clear.10 7 At the least, the decision reveals a heightened
awareness of the peculiar problems attending ignorance of the law with re-
spect to criminal omissions, and of the special character of offenses of omis-
sion.
DUTY To CARE FOR OTHERS
The difficulties which beset a discussion of omissions are by no means con-
fined to a treatment of those offenses which already exist. An equally trou-
bling problem is the controversial question of extending liability for omissions
into fields where the criminal law has not so far intruded. Such an extension
is possible in two ways, either by the express legislative creation of fresh
offenses of omission or by a judicial process which may interpret offenses
superficially seeming to be those of commission as ones capable of perpetra-
tion by omission. In both fields, discussion has centered around the possible
imposition of liability for failure to aid those in distress.
The conventional way of approaching the duty to care for others is to say
that a duty to act in the criminal law can never rest on a moral duty alone
but must be supported by some legal expression. Professor Jerome Hall has
sufficiently demonstrated the emptiness of this approach. 08 If it refers to a
duty imposed by the criminal law, it is a tautology. If it implies that neglect
of a duty imposed by any rule of law is always criminal, it is clearly wrong;
for a person may often fail to act under a duty imposed by contract or tort
and not be criminally liable. If it means that every criminal liability for an
omission must rest either upon an express mandate of the criminal law or
at least upon some legal duty outside the sphere of the criminal law, it is
empty of information, for it affords no criterion of the duties in the civil
law that will lead to a criminal liability if breached. The approach is a relic
of the principle worked out in the nineteenth-century manslaughter cases
that the common-law duty to care for children could be used as a base on
which to found a homicide conviction if death ensued through neglect, but
that this duty could not be extended into a more general duty to aid those
in distress where the status relationship of paternal support was absent. The
growth of liability for neglect may perhaps best be traced in this line of cases.
107. In Lambert, the appellant had been convicted of a felony in Los Angeles and
had lived there for seven years. As the dissent points out, the appellant was therefore not
confronted, as may happen under these ordinances, with the difficulty of deciding whether
an offense committed in another jurisdiction can amount to a felony in California. The
ordinances dealing with registration of criminals are helpfully discussed in Note, 103 U.
PA. L. Rav. 60 (1954), where the common practice of prison officials, parole and pro-
bation officers, and even judges to inform convicted criminals of their possible duty to
register is pointed out. The note says, at 82-84, that in one locality (Lakewood, N.J.)
the police department distributes notices of the duty to hotels, bus terminals, restaurants
and post offices. And in St. Paul, Minnesota, the public have been informed of the ordi-
nance by newspaper articles and talks on radio and television.




In England in the nineteenth century, the courts became very ready to
fix liability for death on a parent who neglected to supply necessaries for his
child 100 or on a master or mistress who neglected to care for a helpless
apprentice.110 Early in the century, in Rex v. Smith, the courts had refused
to find the defendants liable for homicide when they had neglected to care
for their mentally defective, middle-aged brother who was living in their
house and to whom they were bound by their father's will to pay an annual
income.11 But in 1893, in Regina v. Instan, the court inferred an under-
taking in the defendant to care for her aunt on the ground that they were
living in the same house and the aunt, who was aged, was supporting the
niece."12 Consequently, a criminal liability for homicide by neglect was also
imposed. Between these two cases, a marked advance had clearly taken place
in the notion of the scope of the duty to care for another. Regrettably, the
courts have not faced up to their own advancing attitudes to social duty.
They have taken refuge in the narrow enclave of the undertaking to care
as a facade behind which to hide the progress of the law. And, as often
happens with such protective devices, the refusal to acknowledge the reality
of the progress has impeded the advance.
The inadequacies of the contract approach are revealed in two interesting
109. Regina v. Bubb, 4 Cox Cr. Cas. 455 (Oxford Cir. 1851). Liability for homicide
through neglect of children was recognized by late Roman law in the east. See the
HExABBLOs, a fourteenth-century manual of Byzantine law, providing: "A person mur-
ders his child not only by suffocating it, but by deserting it or starving it, or by exposing
it in a public place for alms. .. ." O; Torts and Crimes, 6 HARENoouLos, A MANUAL
oF BYZANTINE LAW C. 8, § 15 (Freshfield ed. & transl. 1930).
110. Rex v. Squire, Stafford Lent Assizes 1799, manuscript cited in 1 RusSELL, CRIME
457-58 (Turner ed. 1950); Regina v. Smith, 8 C. & P. 153, 173 Eng. Rep. 438 (Cent.
Crim. Ct. 1837).
11k 2 G. & P. 449, 172 Eng. Rep. 203 (Gloucester Assizes 1826).
112. 17 Cox Cr. Cas. 602 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1893). The contrast between the two cases
is pointed out by HALL, op. cit. supra note 108, at 274-75. The judgment of Lord Cole-
ridge, C.J., in Instant is powerful and attractive: "It is not correct to say that every moral
obligation is a legal duty, but every legal duty is founded upon a moral obligation. In
this case, as in most cases, the legal duty can be nothing else than taking upon oneself
the performance of the moral obligation. There is no question whatever that it was this
woman's clear duty to impart to the deceased so much of that food which was taken in
the house for both and was paid for by the deceased as was necessary to sustain her life.
The deceased could not get it for herself, she could only get it through the prisoner. It
was the prisoner's clear duty at common law to supply it to the deceased and that duty
she did not perform .... There is no case directly in point but it would be a slur and
a stigma upon our law if there could be any doubt as to the law to be derived from the
principle of decided cases, if cases were necessary. There was a clear moral obligation
and a legal duty founded upon it; a duty wilfully disregarded . . . ." 17 Cox Cr. Cas.
at 603-04. The court was clearly influenced by the fact that the deceased supported the
accused. For the history of the French law of homicide by neglect of dependents, see
ALBARET-MONTEYROUX, L'INA cTION EN DRoIr PtNAL 102 (1944).
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English nineteenth-century decisions-the cases of Knights "3 and Shep-
herd.1 4 In the Knights case, the defendant had neglected to take any steps
to ensure the safe delivery of a child about to be born to her. She had
denied her pregnancy a few hours before the birth, although she had had a
child before and must have known of the imminence of the birth. The child
was found dead in a bag in the defendant's room. The prosecution submitted
that, if the jury were to find that the defendant knew she was about to be
confined, omitted to take the necessary steps to preserve the life of the child,
and as a result the child died, she would be guilty of manslaughter. Over-
ruling this argument, the court took the view that such facts could not estab-
lish liability for homicide, and the defendant was convicted of concealment of
birth. Any view of the merits of this decision must depend on one's attitude
to the advisability of protecting stringently the lives of newly born children,115
but if the duty of the mother to care for her living child is admitted, little
reason can be found to exempt her from the duty to prepare for a safe
birth." 6
In Shepherd, the defendant had neglected to provide a midwife for her
eighteen-year-old daughter who was in labor, and through this neglect the
daughter died. The daughter had lived with the defendant and her step-
father. The trial judge instructed the jury that if it believed the neglect to
be the cause of death, it must convict of murder or manslaughter, the verdict
to depend on whether the defendant intended to bring about the death. A
conviction of manslaughter was returned, but a point of law was reserved
for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. Here, the five judges were unani-
mous in holding that the defendant could not be criminally liable. Their
reasoning proceeds on tortured and convoluted grounds. The duty to take
care, the court asserted, must proceed from contract or relationship. In the
instant case, no contract existed, and the duty could not be based on the
relationship, since the child was not a helpless infant. The duty to provide
necessaries for children who are not helpless infants is on the father primarily
113. Regina v. Knights, 2 F. & F. 46, 175 Eng. Rep. 952 (Bury St. Edmund's Spring
Assizes 1860).
114. Regina v. Shepherd, L. & C. 147, 169 Eng. Rep. 1340 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1862).
115. See, generally, WILLIAms, SANCTITY OF L=' AND THE CRIMI-,AL LAW 5-33
(1957).
116. Knights was followed by Rex v. Izod, 20 Cox Cr. Cas. 690 (Oxford Cir. 1904).
But contrast these cases with Regina v. Handley, 13 Cox Cr. Cas. 79 (Oxford Cir. 1874),
where the judge directed the jury that the defendant would be guilty of murder if she
had intended the death of the child and left it to die after birth or if she intended to con-
ceal the birth and used methods that would probably result in death. The difference seems
to be that the neglect of precautions before birth to provide a safe birth will not result
in liability, but any neglect of the child after birth may. This is a subtle ground of dis-
tinction and is hardly in accord with the general common-law view that where a child is
born alive subsequent death may amount to homicide even though the actus retus of the
accused preceded birth. See also Regina v. Edwards, 8 C. & P. 611, 173 Eng. Rep. 640
(K.B. 1838); Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899); Commonwealth v. Hall,
322 Mass. 523, 78 N.Ef2d 644 (1948) ; 1 RussELL, CamE 456-57 (Turner ed. 1950).
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and not the mother; and, by statute, a stepfather's duty to care for his
children ends before they reach the age of eighteen. The court was also
impressed by the point that the mother might not have been able to pay for
the services of a midwife. The midwife might have been willing to act gratui-
tously, but the court felt that the defendant could not be liable criminally for
failing to request services which might have been gratuitously rendered.""
The decision is shocking, particularly in view of the evidence that the
mother failed to call a midwife out of hostility to her daughter. The spirit of
the later nineteenth-century cases, particularly that of Instan, suggests that
Shepherd will not be followed.1lS Indeed, in Rex v. Gibbins and Proctor, the
Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the murder convictions of a man and
his mistress for the death of the man's child through neglect. 1" 9 The man
kept the woman supplied with sufficient money to feed his children, but,
apparently through malevolence, she denied food and attention to one of them,
who died from starvation. Counsel for the appellants argued that the man's
duty was fulfilled by supplying enough money for household needs, while the
woman should be exempt since the legal obligation to maintain was on the
husband. The Court of Criminal Appeal very properly dismissed these argu-
ments. In answer to the father's contention, the court said: "He is in this
dilemma; if he did not see her [the daughter] the jury might well infer that
he did not care if she died; if he did he must have known what was going
on."'12 And to the woman: "She had charge of the child. She was under no
obligation to do so or to live with Gibbins, but she did so, and receiving
money, as it is admitted she did, for the purpose of supplying food, her duty
was to see that the child was properly fed and looked after .... ,,121 These
117. Now, the English Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 & 24 GEo. 5, C. 12,
§ 1(2) (a), provides that an inability to provide food, clothes or medical assistance shall
be no defense to a criminal prosecution unless the defendant can show he made an appli-
cation to the poor law authorities (now the National Assistance Board) for aid. At
common law, there was a duty to bury the dead, but in Regina v. Vann, 2 Den. 325, 169
Eng. Rep. 523 (Q.B. 1851), the court -held that a parent was not liable for failure to bury
a dead child where he had no money to pay for the burial, even though he was offered
a loan by the poor law authorities. The court felt that the parent had no obligation to
get into debt or, to put it another way, that the necessity of getting into debt to comply
with the duty was equivalent to making the task impossible of performance. This raises
the interesting question of impossibility of performance as a general defense to crimes
of omission. "It may be laid down as a general proposition that where the law imposes
a duty to act, non-compliance with the duty will be excused where compliance is physical-
ly impossible." WILLIAMS, CRIM NAL LAw 588 (1953), citing Regina v. Bamber, 5 Q.B.
279, 114 Eng. Rep. 1254 ('1843) (no liability for not repairing a road when it was
washed away by the sea). Interesting cases in this area are those considering how far
the citizen need go to discharge his duty of aiding the police. See, particularly, Dougherty
v. State, 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393 (1895).
118. Professor Hall thinks that Instan overrules Shepherd, but it does not expressly
do so. HALL, op. cit. supra note 108, at 275 n.68.
119. 13 Crim. App. R. 134 (1918).
120. Id. at 139.
121. Ibid.
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cases point to a healthier approach, but they do not remove all traces of
doubt about the basis of liability. In Instan, the accused was supported by
the deceased; in Gibbins and Proctor, the victim was a seven-year-old child.
Both can thus be distinguished from Shepherd's case. While a new attitude
is surely apparent, a solider footing of principle would be welcome.
A cause c~l~bre in this field is the Michigan decision in People v. Beards-
ley in 1907.122 The defendant had spent the weekend in his apartment with
a woman while his wife was away. They drank heavily, and finally the
woman sent out for morphine and camphor. The defendant detected her tak-
ing some of the tablets and struck the box from her hand, but she had taken
enough to send her into a coma. The defendant procured a friend to carry
the woman to a basement apartment, since he was too intoxicated to do this
himself. As a result of delay in receiving medical attention, the woman died.
At the trial, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to a
term of one to five years. But on appeal, the conviction was reversed; for,
in the court's view, the defendant was under no legal duty to care for the
woman, although the fact that he must have known her life was in danger
was conceded. The duty, said the court, must be imposed by law or contract.
"The fact that this woman was in his house created no such duty as exists
in law and is due from a husband towards his wife. . . .Such an inference
would be very repugnant to our moral sense."'
123
To be temperate about such a decision is difficult. In its savage proclama-
tion that the wages of sin is death, it ignores any impulse of charity and
compassion. It proclaims a morality which is smug, ignorant and vindictive.
In a civilized society, a man who finds himself with a helplessly ill person
who has no other source of aid should be under a duty to summon help,
whether the person is his wife, his mistress, a prostitute or a Chief Justice.
The Beardsley decision deserves emphatic repudiation by the jurisdiction
which was responsible.
An interesting problem, on which the present law is vague, is the possible
duty of X, who has caused danger to Y through no fault of his own, to aid
Y. In the special case of accidents through the operation of motor vehicles,
this duty is clearly established by statute, but outside this field the position
is not clear. X may start a fire in a building accidentally. He escapes himself
and then sees Y trapped at a window. X could save Y by propping up an
available ladder, but he will not do so. If Y is burnt to death, is X guilty
either of murder or manslaughter? That he should not be seems deplorable,
but criminal liability is by no means clear. This kind of situation is raised
by an interesting Kentucky decision, King v. Commonwealth.2 4 There, the
defendant had shot and wounded X while defending his father from X's at-
tack. The defendant called a police officer but left X lying and did not at-
122. 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1,128 (1907).
123. Id. at 214, 113 N.W. at 1131.
124. 285 Ky. 654, 148 S.W.2d 1044 (1941).
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tempt to summon a doctor. In fact, no doctor was available within five miles,
and the defendant had no car or telephone. The victim died, and the defend-
ant was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the conviction was reversed.
Where the initial shooting was unlawful, a subsequent failure to summon
aid which accelerates death or converts a nonfatal wound into a fatal one
amounts to murder. But since the instruction to the jury had proceeded on
the basis that the defendant's liability must be predicated on the unlawfulness
of the initial shooting, and since the nature of the jury's finding indicated
that they believed the shooting to be in defense of the accused's father, the
court felt it must quash the conviction.
The judgment is tantalizing; the court refused to analyze those circum-
stances in which a duty to aid may be imposed on people who have justifi-
ably or accidentally caused harm. Of course, the victim was the initial wrong-
doer, but in another case the victim may be innocent. Does this affect the
defendant's position? The court said the decision did not imply that those
who prevent a victim from obtaining aid may not be guilty of homicide "when
the duty to render it exists,"'1 25 but it did not indicate in what circumstances
the duty might exist. What of the mountain climber who cuts a rope secur-
ing another so that one is sacrificed to save ten others whom he is imperil-
ing? Perhaps the climber is under no liability for his initial act, for he can
plead the necessity of saving the greater number. But will he be outside the
reach of the law of homicide if he neglects to render aid, when he reason-
ably could, to the climber whom he has cut down? In the present law, no
clear warrant imposes liability. The possible situations here are graduated:
first, the defendant who injures a wrongdoer in repelling him; next, the
defendant who accidentally injures an innocent victim; and, finally, the de-
fendant who out of necessity deliberately sacrifices an innocent victim. Al-
though the same glaring moral obligation does not arise in all three cases,
they are all proper subjects for the recognition by the criminal law of a duty
to aid. In the English case of Green v. Cross, the accused was charged with
the statutory offense of cruelty to animals.' 2r He had found a dog caught in
a vermin trap which he had lawfully laid down; but he delayed for two hours
before taking steps to have the dog released. The divisional court, Channell,
J., dissenting, held the trial court wrong in dismissing the complaint and
sent the case back with a direction that, on the evidence, a conviction might
be proper. The court felt that an omission of this nature could establish lia-
bility though the language of the statute did not expressly refer to failures
to act. Channell, J., dissented on the ground that an affirmative act was
necessary for liability. This interesting decision regrettably does not discuss
the wider implications of the holding as a basis for liability for homicide.
From this survey of a few crucial decisions, the lack of any firm, discern-
ible principle in the present law must be apparent. The implied contract
125. Id. at 659, 148 S.W.2d at 1047.
126. 103 L.T.R. 279 (K.B. 1910). See discussion in WmLIAms, CjIMIxAL LAW 5-6
(1953).
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theory is inadequate even to cover the existing decisions, which seem to rest
on the assumption by the defendant of a moral responsibility, as Lord Cole-
ridge, C.J., insisted so courageously in Regina v. Instan.127 But a view of
moral responsibility is surely outmoded which imposes liability on the father
who does not warn his child of the precipice before him, but not on a
stranger who neglects to warn the child, or which would convict of homicide
a man who fails to call a doctor for his wife, but not a man who fails to do
so for a weekend mistress. The same anomaly is to be found in the cases of
death resulting from a defendant's neglect of the duties of his employment.
The railroad crossing watchman who deliberately does not take steps to warn
and protect a pedestrian from an approaching train may be guilty of murder,
but the stranger who, knowing of the train's approach, fails to warn is guilty
of no crime at all. 12 8 And this is due to the watchman's breach of his con-
tract of employment, which seems utterly irrelevant to his intent to do noth-
ing to prevent the pedestrian's probable death.129 The law often lags a half
century or so behind public mores, but the spectacle cannot be lightly enter-
tained in a field of this importance. The duty to take active steps to save
others, and a liability for homicide in the absence of such action, could well
be based on the defendant's clear recognition of the victim's peril plus his
failure to take steps which might reasonably be taken without risk to himself
to warn or protect the victim. For those who have a special duty to look out
for such dangers, such as the watchman, a case for liability might be based
on a reckless failure to observe the danger, but the significance of the con-
tract of employment should be no greater.130
127. See note 112 sutpra.
128. But in Regina v. Smith, 11 Cox Cr. Cas. 210 (Northern Cir. 1869), a railroad-
crossing keeper who left his post, a pedestrian being killed in his absence, was not liable
for homicide on the strange ground that the watchman owed no duty to the public, since
his employer was not required by law to employ a watchman for the protection of the
public. Compare State v. Harrison, 107 N.J.L. 213, 152 Atl. 867 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Rex
v. Pittwood, 19 T.L.R. 37 (Taunton Assizes 1902).
129. It is not suggested that the stranger and the watchman should be in the same
position as to liability. If neither of them knows of the approaching train, the stranger
should be subject to no liability at all, but the watchman might well be liable for man-
slaughter. For his contract of employment is evidence of his duty to anticipate the ap-
,proach of trains, and his failure to notice one might well amount to recklessness. Even
here, it is dangerous to speak of his liability for negligence. In the area of homicide, the
injection of liability for simple negligence is not to be welcomed.
130. A draft proposal for liability for homicide based on the failure to warn or rescue
was put forward by LIVINGSTON, Code of Crimes and Punishieints, in 2 COm=LETE WORxs
126-27 (1873): "Homicide by omission only is committed by voluntarily permitting an-
other to do an act that must, in the natural course of things, cause his death, without
apprizing him of his danger if the act be involuntary, or endeavouring to prevent it if it
be voluntary. He shall be presumed to have permitted it voluntarily who omits the
necessary means of preventing the death, when he knows the danger and can cause it to
be avoided without danger of personal injury or pecuniary loss." An interesting approach
is that of the new KoREAN CimiNAL CoDE oF 1953, which provides in art. 18: "A person




Even where a duty to act is clearly recognized by express provision of
law, resulting liability for homicide through subsequent death is traditionally
plagued by the question of causation. This was a topic which much troubled
the German jurists of the nineteenth century. Liiden put forward the theory
that man is always acting; thus, if he omits to rescue or warn, he does so
because he is doing something else, such as looking on or walking away.'
31
This substituted positive act, Lfiden suggests, must be regarded as the cause
of the harm. A more popular approach, in accord with the Anglo-American
view, was that of Glaser.13 2 He posited culpability for the man who omitted
to halt a force which he originally put in motion or who, if he did not orig-
inally put the force in motion, had a specific duty to intervene. As already
suggested, this approach is more of an abdication than a constructive pro-
,posal. A later theory regarded the omission itself as causal on a "but for"
argument: but for the defendant's failure to intervene, the harm would never
have happened.'3 3 This view commends itself to a modern French commen-
tator who uses, to describe the defendant's responsibility for failure to inter-
vene when peril approaches the victim from natural causes, the felicitous
phrase "complicit6 du cas fortuit.'u3 4 In Anglo-American writings, the prob-
lem of causation in the field of omissions has been best treated by Professor
Jerome Hall. 13" He points out that no difficulty arises in establishing a causal
link between the inactivity of a father who fails to rescue his child and the
death of the child. The causal problem is in a physical sense no different
when the one who fails to rescue is not the father but a stranger. The prob-
lem is easily dissipated, Professor Hall suggests, by a recognition that, in the
criminal law as in the law of torts, causation is not altogether or even chief-
ly a question of mechanical connection or scientific law but a mixed question
turning largely on the policy of imputing or denying liability.
In this context, causation has sometimes been used to deny liability for a
failure to act and so restrict the duty to take steps for the care of others.
An excellent example is the judgment of Lord Campbell, C.J., in Regina v.
by his own act, does not prevent danger from arising shall be punished for the results
of such danger." This provision is commented on by Ryu, The New Korean Criminal
Code of October 3, 1953, 48 JouxNAL Cam. L., C & P.S. 275, 286-87 (1957). Mr. Ryu
writes: "[The section] does not state upon what conditions the duty to prevent danger
depends. This is left to judicial interpretation. The courts have formulated three grounds
upon which the duty to prevent danger is based: statute or customary law, contract, and
principles of good faith and public policy. It is believed that the third mentioned source
should be invoked only in extreme cases ......
131. LDEN, ABHANDLUNGEN AUS DEM GEMEINEN TEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHT 74 (1840).
132. 1 GLASER, ABHANDLUNGEN AUS DEM tOSTERREICHISCfHEN 289 (1888).
133. SiGWART, DER BEGRIFF DES WOLLENS 33 (1870); WINDELRAND, Dm BEGEHUNG
DURCH UNrEMLASSUNG (1887), discussed in ALBA -MONTPEYROUX, L'INAcrioN EN
DROIT PANAL 92 (1944).
134. Id. at 86.
135. HALL, GExmzAr PmaNcII.Es OF CnimIn.N LAW 256-66 (1947).
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Pocock.136 There, the trustees appointed under a local act to repair roads
had neglected to contract for repairs, and, because of the resulting disrepair
of one road, a man was killed. The court refused to recognize a liability for
homicide in the trustees:
"No doubt the neglect of a personal duty, when death ensues as the
consequence of such neglect, renders the party guilty of it liable to an
indictment for manslaughter. . . . But how can the principles I have
stated apply to the present case? It cannot be said that the trustees are
guilty of felony in neglecting to contract. Not only must the neglect, to
make the party guilty of it liable to the charge of felony, be personal,
but the death must be the immediate result of that personal neglect.
According to the argument here, it might be said that where the in-
habitants generally are bound to repair, and a death is caused as in the
present case, all the inhabitants are indictable for manslaughter."' 37
But the liability of all the inhabitants for manslaughter is not a ludicrous
idea. Obviously, duties such as the repair of roads are better imposed on
more precise bodies than the inhabitants of a community generally, but even
if the duty is so placed, nothing seems impractical about imposing a com-
munal fine for the punishment of a death caused by neglect of the duty.
The American decisions also reveal many-instances of causation as a de-
vice for denying liability for homicide. In State v. Reitze, an innkeeper had
served drink to an intoxicated person who slipped as he was getting into his
wagon and died from the fall .38 The New Jersey court held that the hotel
keeper could not be convicted of manslaughter. Death was not the usual
result of overindulgence, said the court, and therefore liability could not be
based on the sale of the liquor to the deceased while intoxicated. Neither
could it be founded on the defendant's failure to help the deceased on his
way when he was leaving, for, again, the defendant had no reason to assume
that the result of his failure to assist the deceased would be the latter's death.
The death, then, was not a natural and probable consequence of the accused's
acts and failures to act.
The decision may be reasonable. The defendant, by his initial wrongful act
in serving liquor to the deceased while he was drunk, had collaborated with
the deceased's own foolishness. If the deceased's condition had been one of
complete helplessness, to allow him to attempt to make his way home through
a snowstorm might be a sufficiently reckless omission to predicate liability
for manslaughter. The judgment is at fault in not discussing more fully the
136. The Queen v. Pocock, 17 Q.B. 34, 117 Eng. Rep. 1194 (1851).
137. Id. at 38-39, 117 Eng. Rep. at 1,196. Stephen was very conscious of the causation
difficulty. See 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRImiNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 9-10 (1883):
"It would be extravagant to say that a man who, having food in London, omits to give
it to a person starving to death in China, has killed the man in China .... A number of
people who stand around a shallow pond in which a child is drowning and let it drown
without taking the trouble to ascertain the depth of the pond are, no doubt, shameful
cowards, but they can hardly be said to have killed the child." Why not?
138. 86 N.J.L. 407, 92 Atl. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
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exact extent of the deceased's incapacity, but in so far as the facts appear,
the decision seems to be justifiable.
Rietae may be compared with two decisions in which the causation ap-
proach seems to have been used to exonerate a defendant who eminently
deserved conviction. In Bradley v. State, the defendant was a Christian
Scientist.130 He had neglected for several weeks to call a doctor for his minor
daughter who had fallen into the fire during an epileptic attack and had been
horribly burnt. The ground for reversal of defendant's conviction was main-
ly the impossibility of saying that a physician might have prevented the
child's death, had one been promptly summoned. Thus, a causal link between
the father's neglect and the child's death could not be established. The
majority view-there was a powerful dissent-was clearly much influenced
by the sincerity of the father's religious beliefs. But sincerity is a virtue
which loses its appeal when it involves the passive contemplation of a child
during weeks of hideous suffering. The extent of the child's suffering should
admittedly not obscure the fact that the charge was one of homicide, not
cruelty to a child; but since medical testimony in the case suggested that
prompt attention might have saved the life of the child, the reversal of the
conviction is bard to understand.
140
An earlier and even more incomprehensible decision is State v. Lowe.' 41
The accused had agreed for consideration to take care of a pregnant woman
during her delivery and to furnish her with medical assistance. When the
woman was helpless and unable to leave the room to which the defendant
had taken her, he neglected to provide her with any medical care. In addition
to her pregnancy, or perhaps as a concomitant, she was suffering from blood
poisoning and consequently died. A conviction for third degree murder was
reversed on the ground that the state had failed to allege in the indictment
that the omission of the defendant to call medical aid was the cause of death.
But in fact the indictment did charge that the deceased died "of the said
neglect and the sickness induced thereby," seemingly an ample allegation. The
court, however, seemed impressed by the fact that the woman's blood poison-
ing was not induced by the accused's neglect but antedated it.
Both these cases show an unnecessary delicacy in approaching the problem
of the link between failure to provide medical care and death. In neither case
was the illness induced by the accused's act, but both defendants were under
a clear duty to care for the deceased during sickness by even the narrowest
legal test. In such situations, where the deceased has suffered an extreme
illness of obvious gravity, and where no steps at all were taken by the ac-
cused to summon medical aid, the analogy of the commission cases suggests
that lack of causal connection is an improper ground for decision. Thus,
139. 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920).
140. The court is partly redeemed by the dissenting judgment of West, J. Id. at 657,
84 So. at 679. Compare The Queen v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 (1898) ; Stehr v. State,
92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913).
141. 66 Minn. 296, 68 N.W. 1074 (1896).
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where an apparently healthy victim has been struck down by a bullet or
knife, a causal link is established when the prosecution introduces evidence
describing the nature of the wound. No one would suggest that the pros-
ecution must introduce evidence to show that the victim would not have died
at that moment if the wound had not been inflicted. Similarly, if D shoots X
so that X is unable to board an airplane which crashes with the loss of every-
one on board, D will still be guilty of murder even though X does not die
until after the time of the airplane crash in which he would probably have
lost his life in any case. The omission cases, though more complex, are not
essentially different. The prosecution must still be under a burden to go for-
ward with evidence showing the causal link between the accused's failure to
act and the death, but is this burden not adequately discharged by showing
a grievous sickness in the deceased so that death was a likely consequence,
a duty in the defendant to summon medical aid and defendant's knowledge
of the deceased's danger and his failure to procure aid? The nature of the
charge of homicide in these cases is that the defendant denied the deceased
the ordinary civilized opportunities for saving or prolonging life. The state
of modern medicine is such that it is difficult to conceive of a case in which
life could not, at the very least, be prolonged. There seems to be no valid
objection to taking judicial notice of this and allowing the prosecution to
rest when it has established the dangerous nature of the sickness and the
failure to call aid. Of course, as in the commission cases, the defendant may
then introduce evidence to show that the deceased would have died anyway,
even with the alleviations of medicine, but to raise a good defense he must
create a doubt on the question whether medical aid could have prolonged the
life of the deceased even for an instant.
Knowledge in the accused of the dangerous nature of the deceased's sick-
ness is also essential for liability. But how far must the prosecution go to
show such knowledge? It will be no breach with settled doctrine to suggest
that once it has been shown that the deceased was so sick that the reasonable
man would have perceived danger, the prosecution has sufficiently raised an
inference of knowledge and the burden shifts to the accused to rebut it if he
can. A further difficulty then arises in the cases where the accused has
deliberately refrained from calling a doctor because of his religious beliefs,
as in Bradley. The only satisfactory solution for such a situation seems to
be a resolute denial of the admissibility of such beliefs as a defense. Society
cannot allow individuals to opt out of their duty to care for others, however
passionate their convictions may be. The interest in religious freedom shrinks
and vanishes before the interest in the health and lives of children. 142
142. The comment of the English court in the celebrated prosecution of an eminent
surgeon for performing a therapeutic abortion, an admittedly distinguishable fact situa-
tion, is interesting here: "On the other hand there are people who, from what are said
to be religious reasons, object to the operation being performed under any circumstances.
That is not the law either. On the contrary, a person who holds such an opinion ought
not to be an obstetrical surgeon, for if a case arose where the life of the woman could
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A very different attitude on causation is revealed in People v. Smith. 48
Here, the defendant was vice-president and general manager of a railroad
corporation. His duties involved the employment, training and supervision
of the engineers. Defendant was charged with employing an incompetent
engineer and failing to stipulate safe maximum speeds; as a result, a train
being run at an excessive speed was derailed, and a passenger died. The
defendant was indicted for manslaughter, his demurrer was overruled and he
appealed. He urged that his omission to issue proper instructions and give
proper training and supervision could not be treated as the direct cause of
the accident, since the engineer might and ought to have known what speed
was reasonable and to have observed it. The court dismissed this point and
affirmed the order disallowing the demurrer
44
This comparison of cases reveals the strange readiness of courts to find
against a defendant in a homicide prosecution based on neglect of a duty of
employment, and, on the other hand, an equally strange reluctance to convict
for homicide in a case of neglect of a helpless person. There is an under-
standable delicacy about branding with the stamp of homicide an ignorant
and ill-informed parent; but, remarkably, the defendants in the employment
cases are held to a standard close to that of simple negligence in tort law,
while in the cases of neglect of helpless persons, the accused sometimes seems
to have escaped when his conduct was at the least reckless. These anomalous
results reveal a fundamental maladjustment of the law of manslaughter to
modern feeling and opinion.
Legislative Impasition of Duty To Aid
Judicial extension of liability for homicide by neglect is one way in which
the duty to aid one's fellow man in distress may be stimulated. In the com-
mon-law countries, this method of expansion seems to have halted about the
end of the last century and appears incapable of further progress within the
existing conceptual framework. An alternative possibility is direct legislative
imposition of liability for a failure to aid those in peril. In common-law
countries, this proposal has received no concrete expression except in motor-
ist cases. But in Europe, it is becoming increasingly fashionable.
be saved by performing the operation and the doctor refused to perform it because of
his religious opinions and the woman died, he would be in grave peril of being brought
before this Court on a charge of manslaughter by negligence." The King v. Bourne,
[1939] 1 K.B. 687, 693 (1938).
143. 56 Misc. 1) 105 N.Y. Supp. 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
144. A more lenient attitude toward causation may be displayed in the defendant's
favor in criminal cases as compared with civil suits. Two instructive decisions to com-
pare are United States v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Cas. 800, No. 15540 (N.D. Cal. 1864), and
Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931). The ITALIAN PENAL CODE OF
1930, art. 40, deals expressly with the question of causation in omissions by providing:
"Not to prevent an event which it is legally obligatory to prevent is equivalent to caus-
ing it."
19581
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In France, by a Vichy law of 1941, liability was imposed for a failure to
give assistance to a person in peril where that person lost his life or suffered
serious bodily harm as a result of the neglect.145 After the liberation, this
law was remodeled and is now to be found as article sixty-three of the
Code Penal:
"Whoever is able to prevent by his immediate action, without risk to
himself or others, the commission of a serious crime or offense against
the person, and voluntarily neglects to do so shall be liable to imprison-
ment from one month to three years and a fine of 24,000 to 1,000,000
francs, or one of these penalties only.
"The same punishments are applicable to one who voluntarily neglects
to give to a person in peril assistance which he could render without
risk to himself or others whether by his personal action or by procuring
aid."146
The Dalloz editor comments that the article does not specify the cause or
nature of the .peril; it is enough that it be "imminent et constant et ndcessite
une intervention imm6diate. '1 47 It has been applied to a doctor who refused
to go to a person who was dangerously ill 14s and a hospital director who
refused to admit a patient whom a doctor declared to be dangerously ill.1 49
On the other hand, an accident witness, himself injured and in need of treat-
ment, was relieved of his duty to aid a victim.10
Again, article 147 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code provides that "whoever
fails to offer help to a person exposed to immediate danger, although he
was able to do so without any danger to himself or any other person, shall
be punished by detention for not more than one year."''
And the Italian Penal Code of 1930, article 593, provides that:
"Whoever finds, abandoned or lost, a child under the age of ten years,
or another person incapable through disease of mind or body, or through
old age or other cause, of looking after himself, and neglects to give
immediate notification to the authorities shall be punished with penal
servitude up to three months or a fine ....
"Any person who, finding a human body which is or appears to be life-
less, or a person wounded or otherwise in danger, neglects to afford the
necessary assistance or to give immediate notification to the authorities,
shall be liable to the same penalty.
145. DONNEDIEU DE VABREs, TRAIr DE DRorr C miTI. 73 (3d ed. 1947).
146. 'CoDE PtNAL art. 63 (53d ed., Dalloz 1956). Translation by the author. Ancient
Egyptian law punished as a murderer one who could save a man under attack and did
not do so. 1 TYTL.a, I-hsToRy 37 (1844).
147. CODE PtNAL art. 63 (53d ed., Dalloz 1956).
148. Cour de cassation (Ch. crim.), May 31, 1949, [1949] Dalloz Jurisprudence 347;
Tribunal correctionnel de Charleville, Feb. 6, 1952, [1952] Dalloz Jurisprudence 481.
Compare Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).
149. Tribunal correctionnel de Douai, Dec. 20, 1951, [1952] Dalloz Sommaires 53.
150. Tribunal correctionnel de Rouen, March 31, 1949, [1950] Dalloz Sommaires 9.




"If by reason of the guilty person's conduct a personal injury results,
the punishment shall be increased; if death results, the penalty shall be
doubled."'
5 2
A Soviet commentator has conjectured that a similar duty is imposed by
article 130 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.: "It is the duty of every
citizen of the U.S.S.R. to abide by the constitution of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline, honest-
ly to perform public duties and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse."
The commentator writes:
"Illegality of a failure to act may be based not only on specific require-
ments of the law. . . but also on the fundamental propositions contained
in Art. 130 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. The court, depending
on the concrete peculiarities of a given situation, must establish whether
a given person is required to render assistance to another from the point
of view of the relationship which ought to exist in a socialist society (in
accordance with the rules of community life under socialism). For ex-
ample it would violate Art. 130 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. if
a healthy person who knew how to swim failed to render aid in the sum-
mer time to another person who was drowning in a river not far from
the bank."'
15 3
In the German Federal Republic, a law of 1953 provides:
"Whoever fails to render assistance in case of accidents or common
danger or emergency, even though such assistance was required and he
could be expected to render it under the circumstances, particularly with-
out considerable danger to himself and without violating other important
duties, shall be punished with imprisonment up to one year or by fine.' 54
In 1952 the Bundesgerichtshof held that a similar earlier provision did not
apply to a wife who had quarreled with her husband and did not come to his
aid when she found him hanging himself.155 The court's decision was based
on the view that suicide could not be regarded as an accident within the
152. Quoted in MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
1304 (1940).
153. 11 GRAZHDANSK:OE PRAvo 392 (1938), quoted in HAZARD, MATERIALS ON SOVET
LAW 54 (1947). See also Note, Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM.
L. REv. 631 (1952). The extract is from a Soviet text on civil law, and it is therefore
not clear that the commentator is implying a criminal sanction.
154. Law of Aug. 3, 1953, [1953] BUNDFSGESETZBLATT pt. 1, at 735. This represents
a denazified version of the Law of June 28, 1935, [1935] REicHSGESETZBLATT pt. 1, at
833, which had imposed a duty to assist when there was such a duty "according to the
people's sound sentiment." See SCH6NKE-SCHR6DER, STRAFGESEMZBUCH KOMaENTAR 917-
20 (7th ed. 1954) ; Ryu, supra note 130, at 284.
155. Decision of Bundesgerichtshof, Feb. 12, 1952, 2 ENTSCHEDuNGEN DES BUNDES-
GERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN, herausgegeben von den Mitgliedern des Gerichtshofes
und der Bundesanwaltschaft 150. The court, however, indicated that a conviction for
manslaughter might be founded on such facts. An interesting extract from the court's
judgment is given in Silving, Eutthanasia: A Study in Comparative Crininal Law, 103
U. PA. L REv. 350, 373 n.94 (1955).
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
meaning of the provision, but on this point the finding has now been re-
versed. 156
Conventional criticisms of the imposition of a duty to rescue are usually
based on objections to compelling one man to serve another, to creating a fear
of prosecution which might cause citizens to interfere officiously in the affairs
of others, and to the feasibility of imposing liability on a crowd of spectators
all of whom had knowledge of the peril but were too selfish to intervene. 7
These objections, however, do not seem to have much merit. To the first, the
reply may be made that the evil of interfering with individual liberty by com-
pelling assistance is much outweighed by the good of preserving human life.
The second is a speculation which would be difficult to support. The third
point appears to pose a real difficulty, but it is no different from a situation
which commonly occurs in offenses of commission. In a riot, for example, it
is difficult if not impossible to bring all the participants to book, but this has
never been considered an obstacle to trial and punishment of those who can
be reached. If a crowd of spectators stands by and watches a child drown in
shallow water, nothing seems objectionable in trying and punishing all who
can be tracked down and cannot show a reasonable excuse. To think that such
an example of selfish group inertia could exist in our society is distressing,
but, if it did, there would be every reason for invoking the criminal law against
it.
The time is ripe for Anglo-American systems to translate into legislative
fact the modem consciousness of interdependence. Surely, it is not in socialist
countries alone that the duty of a citizen to help his fellows in these situations
of extreme peril can be recognized. 5 8
CONCLUSION
Apart from the public welfare offenses, criminal liability for inaction is
spreading, and some of the recent extensions have been into areas of urgent
156. Ibid.
157. See Note, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 631, 641-42 (1952) ; Honori, Le Defaut D'Assist-
ance, 26 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PkNiAL 393 (1955); Levasseur, L'Omnission
de Porter Secours, 26 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNuAL 407 (1955).
158. The impulse to rescue those in danger has been recognized in tort law as natural
and laudable; it does not render injury to the rescuer too remote a consequence to cut off
the liability of a negligent defendant who has imperiled a third party. In Eckert v. Long
Island P.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), Grover, J., said: "The evidence showed that the train
was approaching in plain view of the deceased, and had he for his own purposes at-
tempted to cross the track, or with a view to save property placed himself voluntarily in
a position where he might have received an injury from a collision with the train, his
conduct would have been grossly negligent, and no recovery could have been had for such
an injury. But the evidence further showed that there was a small child upon the track
who, if not rescued, must have been inevitably crushed by the rapidly approaching train.
This the deceased saw and he owed a duty of important obligation to this child to rescue
it from its extreme peril, if he could do so without incurring great danger to himself."
Id. at 505. There is, of course, a difference between saluting heroism by allowing dam-
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importance. In the field of civil liberties, a tendency is becoming apparent to
find certain statutory crimes capable of commission through inaction.' 59 Thus,
in Catlette v. United States, it was held that a police officer who made no
effort to protect some Jehovah's Witnesses from an aggressive mob was prop-
erly convicted. 160 In the court of appeals, Judge Dobie said: "It is true that
a denial of equal protection has hitherto been largely confined to affirmative
acts of discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, has already taken the
position that culpable official State inaction may also constitute a denial of
equal protection." 161 In Lynch v. United States, police officers were convicted
for a failure to take action to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from seizing and
beating Negroes. 162 The court of appeals said: "There was a time when the
denial of equal protection of the laws was confined to affirmative acts, but the
law now is that culpable official inaction may also constitute a denial of equal
protection."'01 3 And recently, in United States v. Konovsky, where the con-
viction of a police officer for failing to take steps to suppress a race riot was
quashed on the ground that the trial court wrongly admitted evidence, the
court at the same time held that evidence of a willful failure to disperse the
crowd could properly be admitted as evidence of conspiracy.16 4
In the field of war crimes, In re Yamashita revealed the possibility of lia-
bility for grave crimes involving the death penalty through a failure to super-
vise subordinates.0 5 The Supreme Court held that the defendant was proper-
ly convicted because of "an affirmative duty to take such measures as were
within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of
war and the civilian population."'0 6 This case exposes the danger of such pro-
ages in this way and requiring intervention. But the "duty to rescue" is clearly recog-
nized in some sense for some purposes.
A famous advocate of the translation of this duty into the criminal sphere was Bent-
ham: "Every man is bound to assist those who have need of assistance if he can do it
without exposing himself to sensible inconvenience. This obligation is stronger, in pro-
portion as the danger is the greater for the one and the trouble of preserving him the
less for the other .... the crime would be greater if he refrained from acting not simply
from idleness, but from malice or some pecuniary interest." BENTHAM, WORKS 164
(1859).
159. 62 STAT. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1952). These sections are con-
cerned with willful deprivation under color of law of rights and privileges by reason of
color or race.
160. 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
161. Id. at 907. The court relied on two Supreme Court decisions, McCabe v. At-
chison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938), but in fact these two decisions do not seem to lend much weight to the
proposition in the Catlette case. See State Action, 1 RAcE REL. LAw REP. 613, 631
(1956).
162. 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951).
163. Id. at 479.
164. 202 F.2d 721 (7th Or. 1953).
165. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
166. Id. at 16.
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ceedings in the absence of a clear resolution of the basis of liability for an
omission. This danger was made clear in the powerful dissenting opinion
of Justice Rutledge; he pointed out that the trial proceedings did not make
explicit whether the accused was convicted on the basis of his knowledge of
the atrocities committed by his subordinates or on the basis of his negligence
in not having knowledge of such atrocities. The failure to be explicit on such
a fundamental issue is inconceivable in the conventional jurisprudence of com-
missions and exposes the lack of firm conceptual foundations for offenses of
omission.
167
Finally, the complexities of governmental control over modern financial
operations have led to a widening liability for omissions. The Securities Act
of 1933 168 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934169 make violation of any
of their provisions or of any of the rules issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission a criminal offense. Under section eleven of the 1933 act, liability
is imposed for failures to make material statements; the same position is prob-
ably reached by section eighteen of the 1934 act.
170
The conclusion which emerges from the present state of the law is that a
penal policy of omissions and a criminal jurisprudence of offenses of omission
are overdue. The penal policy should be governed by the recognition that
nothing inherent in the failure to act ought to mark it off from positive action
as a proper subject for penal law. The legislature should, admittedly, seek to
avoid the strictures of Montesquieu's comment on Sulla 171 that by distin-
guishing an infinite number of actions as murder he found murderers in all
parts.'7 2 But where inaction is evidently socially harmful, no good reason
appears for shrinking from penal prohibition. Any penal policy, however,
must be linked with a consciousness of the need to promulgate and publicize
offenses of omission and a recognition by the judiciary that conventional at-
titudes to mens rea, particularly with respect to ignorance of the law, are not
adequate tools to achieve justice for those accused of inaction.
The pursuit of these inquiries is only possible by a mingling of the tech-
167. The case is discussed in Snyder, Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L. REV.
446 (1949).
168. 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1952).
169. 48 STAT. 94 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1952).
170. See Loss, SEcuRTIEs REGULATION 1169-74 (1951); Herlands, Criminal Law
Aspects of the Securities Act of 1933, 67 U.S.L. REv. 562 (1933) ; Herlands, Criminal
Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REv. 139 (1934).
171. IMONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAws bk. 6, c. 15.
172. Indeed, a policy of imposing liability for omissions may prove unsatisfactory in
some areas. A recent commentator on Soviet labor law writes that, from the late 1920's
to the early 1940's, '"Soviet labor legislation continually increased the degree of compul-
sion and pressure on the working class. . . . Since 1950-1951, the situation has been
changing.... [Flinally, by the decree of April 25, 1955, they abolished court penalties
entirely." Gliksman, Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Policy, 79 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
767-68 (1956). I am indebted for this reference to Professor Leon Lipson of the Yale
Law School.
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niques available to the jurist. Analysis of the nature of the prohibition in-
volved in offenses of omission and of its relation to conventional concepts of
the criminal law is necessary. This analysis is supplemented by and supple-
ments the inquiry into the present operation of offenses of omission and the
harm which may be done to society by the absence of certain penal stimuli to
positive action. And both these approaches are connected and informed by
the ethical consideration of the proper objects of official compulsion. It is a
jurisprudential trinity which mysteriously combines in the wholeness of the
integrated solution.
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